

Combating Terrorism in a Globalized World

**Report by the National War College Student Task Force
on Combating Terrorism**



NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

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*The world is a dangerous place to live,
not because of the people who are evil,
but because of the people who don't do
anything about it.*

—Albert Einstein

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After the events of September 11, 2001, these individuals gathered to do something to assist our Nation in its time of peril. Everyone was touched in some way by what happened. Some of them knew people who died on the hijacked flights or were killed or injured at the Pentagon or World Trade Center. Whether suffering a direct personal loss, every one of them felt compassion for fellow citizens and the Nation. In my view, these 25 individuals are all heroes in their own right. The names listed here are those who gathered together and put aside their own personal needs for a greater purpose—to contribute in any way they could.

And contribute they did. From September 2001 to May 2002, the members of the task force dedicated their time and effort to examining terrorism and developing a strategy to combat this global evil. With the determination of a fighter pilot on final approach to the target, these students worked diligently for over 9,000 hours, toiling through long days, many weekends, and over numerous holidays to understand the problem and fathom a feasible strategy. They were learning about the tools of National Security Strategy even as they were crafting it. Perhaps their greatest attribute was their unconstrained ability to explore new ideas and concepts objectively to understand the emerging threat better. These great Americans made a difference. The strategy laid out in this paper is only a dim reflection of their contribution. Rather, their lasting legacy is the influence that this small group will have on our Nation's efforts to combat terrorism.

The power of an idea is awesome, especially with the support of great leaders, educators, and mentors. One such leader is Colonel Jack Leonard, USAF, who—when a couple of students in his Fundamentals of Strategic Logic course asked, “What if . . . would it help?” and “Could you help us?” and “Do you think we could do it?”—listened and encouraged us as we mapped out the road ahead. Without his initial support, this project would never have been started. Another leader who influenced the group is Bard O’Neil, who tirelessly supported our resolve and devoted considerable time to share his perspective, honed over the course of a lifetime, on the complexities of terrorism and insurgencies.

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Lastly, my most heartfelt appreciation goes to our faculty advisor, Ilana “Chick” Kass. This brave-hearted warrior turned intellectual academic provided first class leadership, guidance, and perspective throughout the entire process. She is a mentor without peer. Absent her relentless energy and sage counsel, this project would never have been as successful or far-reaching in its impact, nor would we have had nearly as much fun. At every step, Lani Kass led us to the target and taught us to “check six.” For all she did to nurture our insight, faith, and knowledge along the journey, we will forever remain in her debt.

—Jay W. Chambers, Jr.
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Foreword

This work by a group of students attending the National Defense University's National War College was born of the terrorist attacks against our Nation on September 11, 2001. The students at the National War College were in the midst of debating U.S. power and influence in national strategy when the first plane hit the World Trade Center. What followed was remarkable. A group of 26 students from various services, agencies, and backgrounds decided to apply their education and collective experience in an unconstrained manner to study this national security threat and develop a plausible strategy to combat it. Their time at the University had been intended to be one of study and reflection to prepare for the leadership challenges ahead. Instead, they accepted a new challenge and managed to contribute to national security strategy even while continuing their course of study.

Their research, analysis, and conclusions were based wholly on open sources. Although much of their thinking is conventional wisdom today, it was novel in the immediate aftermath of September 11, and their original ideas spawned a more comprehensive government review of this threat. Consequently, the Student Task Force on Combating Terrorism was invited to participate in the Interagency Working Group that was drafting the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism. Their ideas and concepts were well received, and many were incorporated in the strategy.

This paper reviews the nature and threat of global terrorism, examines potential global implications of such a threat if not confronted, and proposes a strategy to combat terrorism. The students who worked on this paper did not set out to write the definitive strategy to combat terrorism. Rather, their goals were to study the problem, stimulate discussion, and provide practical recommendations to address an urgent problem. In the few months they had, they made a substantive contribution in addressing a pressing issue, and they deserve enormous credit for their imagination and commitment. National Defense University is publishing their paper as a contribution to the historical record and an example of what a highly motivated group can accomplish in a very short time.

Paul G. Gaffney II
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President

Preface

U.S. Interests in the Global War on Terrorism

Speaking for the United States, I can say this: We covet no one else's territory; we seek no dominion over any other people; we seek the right to live in peace, not only for ourselves but for all the peoples of this earth.¹

—Richard M. Nixon

The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution: “to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the Common Defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” In essence, the first and foremost American national interest is to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which was founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual. The attack on September 11, 2001, is a direct assault on these U.S. interests and values.

The U.S. strategy to combat terrorism should strike a balance between the twin temptations inherent in U.S. exceptionalism: the notion that the United States should remedy every wrong and stabilize every crisis, and the latent instinct to withdraw into itself.² In 1821, John Quincy Adams warned against the American penchant to slay “distant monsters.” He could not have imagined Osama bin Laden and the sheer number of terrorist monsters and the magnitude of their evil. While not every evil can be combated by the United States, the war against terrorism is a defense of core values and vital national interests.

To be truly American, any concept of *national interests* should flow from our democratic tradition and concern for the vitality of democracy around the world. But, as Henry Kissinger has pointed out, the United States also must translate its values into answers to some difficult questions:

What, for our survival, must we seek to prevent no matter how painful the means? What, to be true to ourselves, must we try to accomplish no matter how small the attainable international consensus, and, if necessary, entirely on our own? What wrongs is it essential that we right? What goals are simply beyond our capacity?³

In sum, it is American interests and values at stake in this war. Thus, it is worthy of U.S. action and paramount that the United States prosecutes this war to its finish.

Executive Summary

Terrorism is the societal evil of our time, and the global war on terrorism is our generation's great challenge. This evil must be abolished as slavery and piracy were in the 19th century and Nazism and Apartheid in the 20th century. The strategy of abolishment seeks to create a global environment hostile to all terrorist groups, whether they operate globally, regionally, or within the boundaries of a single state. As a grand strategy, it would provide overarching guidance to orchestrate all instruments of national power while coordinating the collective efforts of the international community. The proposed strategy of abolishment is similar in scope to the strategy of containment of communism because the threat of terrorism, when coupled with weapons of mass destruction, poses no less a threat to the safety and security of the free world.

Abolishing Terrorism as an Instrument of Change

The barbaric practice of terrorism—deliberately threatening or harming noncombatants to achieve political, ideological, or material gain—must be abolished through the concerted efforts of all peaceful nations. This will inevitably be an enduring endeavor that focuses on more than defeating existing terrorist organizations; it also will aim to deter future acts of terrorism and to diminish the underlying causes that enable terrorism to flourish. Though acts of terror can never be wholly prevented, terrorism must be reduced to a level that is isolated, rare, and clearly irrational—that is, useless as a tool of practical policy or politics. This will ultimately allow terrorism to be combated as criminal activity within single states, not as a global war.

To reiterate, the end state of this strategy is twofold: A world free of organized terrorism as an instrument of societal change and a global environment in which terrorism can never again flourish.

Terrorism in the 21st Century

Collectively, terrorist organizations pose the single greatest threat to American and international peace and prosperity. Globalization has enabled terrorists to operate on a global scale in pursuit of global goals. Rather than using terrorism to change a single society or government, terrorism has gone international in pursuit of global aims. Organizations such as Al Qaeda have established a worldwide network of operatives, with links to other terrorist organizations to provide mutual support and assistance. This network has developed links with organized crime, drug trafficking, state sponsors, and companies and corporations sympathetic to its causes. Cumulatively, a virtual nation has been created that possesses the means to conduct war—and in fact has declared war on the world—posing a significant military and foreign policy challenge to which the United States has had no preplanned response.

At the heart of this interconnected network of terror lie several terrorist groups that seek to alter the political status quo in the Middle East, and some even hope to alter the global balance of power.

Propagating a marginal, radical view of Islam, and employing asymmetrical terrorist attacks, they are attempting to unite Muslim peoples against Western culture in general and the United States and Israel in particular. Moved by motives and using tactics resembling those of an insurgency, their goals extend beyond a single society or nation. This suggests a new term for this new phenomenon: pansurgency.

Pansurgency is a networked movement of nonstate actors aimed at overthrowing values, cultures, or societies on an international scale through the use of terrorism, subversion, and armed conflict, with the ultimate goal of establishing a new world order.

The lens of pansurgency makes clear the nature of this conflict. The enormity of the terrorists' goals and objectives is mirrored by their willingness to inflict mass casualties virtually anywhere in the world. Terrorist organizations seek weapons of mass destruction and will not hesitate to use them to further their goals. With the world as their battlefield and globalization as an enabler, their objectives are to:

- unite the Islamic world against the United States and non-Muslim cultures
- obtain weapons of mass destruction for both their status value and coercive power
- destroy Israel and remove infidels from the Middle East
- establish a new global order dominated by those possessing a radical view of Islam.

A Multidimensional Strategy

The fight against terrorism requires a multidimensional, multinational approach aimed at the entire spectrum of terrorism. The United States should encourage all civilized societies to pool diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capabilities to defeat terrorist organizations wherever they exist, deter future acts of terrorism, and ultimately diminish the underlying causes of terrorism. This strategy calls upon states, regional and international organizations, private and public entities, and individuals to collaborate in the war against terrorism. From the largest superpower to the lone citizen, each has a role to play in combating terrorism, and each has a responsibility to share the burden.

3-D Strategy of Abolishment

The United States, in a global leadership role, seeks to abolish terrorism by:

- *Defeating* terrorist groups wherever they exist
- *Deterring* future terrorist acts and their sponsors
- *Diminishing* the underlying causes of terrorism

while defending U.S. citizens at home and abroad.

This strategy should be pursued at all levels *simultaneously*. The United States will lead the effort to combat global terrorism while facilitating regional responses and assisting individual partner states. The goal is to reduce terrorism to a level at which it can be combated as mere crime. The world will never see an end to terrorist acts such as those conducted by the Unabomber and Timothy McVeigh, but the organized and remarkably well-funded terrorism seen today must be eliminated.

This strategy places primary responsibility on the sovereign states that have jurisdiction over terrorist activities within their borders. Many states are well equipped to combat terrorism. Others are weak and require assistance. A few are ambivalent or reluctant and require motivation. Some states support or sponsor terrorists and must be compelled to stop. Through a concerted effort at the global, regional, and sovereign-state level, terrorism must be combated through offensive action, taking the fight directly to terrorist organizations, building capabilities and policies that deter future acts

of terrorism, and identifying and diminishing underlying causes. At the same time, the United States should provide a robust defense for Americans both at home and abroad.

Defeating Terrorist Organizations

The first element of the 3–D Strategy of Abolishment aims to defeat existing terrorist organizations at the global, regional, and state levels. Through direct and indirect use of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power, the United States and its partners seek to defeat terrorist organizations by attacking their centers of gravity while directly compelling or indirectly influencing states that sponsor terrorists. The centers of gravity of terrorist groups include leadership, supporting ideology, finances, command and control network, and sanctuaries. To defeat existing terrorist groups, the United States, its allies, and coalition partners need to:

- identify and isolate terrorist organizations at each level
- disrupt support infrastructure and sanctuaries
- discredit ideology or reasons for committing acts of terrorism
- destroy networks and leadership.

While it is unrealistic to hope to eliminate every single terrorist who possesses the desire to threaten innocent individuals, it *is* possible to eliminate the synergy created by cooperation of disparate terrorist organizations. This effort will reduce the operational scope and capabilities of global and regional terrorists to the point that they become threats only at the individual state level. At this level, the threat can be combated as criminal behavior, which will allow a narrower focus to attack their centers of gravity and allow full engagement of law enforcement mechanisms.

Deterring Future Acts of Terrorism

The second element of the 3–D Strategy of Abolishment focuses on deterring future acts of terrorism. To establish a credible deterrent, the United States and the international community should develop and maintain a set of capabilities and mechanisms that clearly communicate to potential terrorists and their supporters that costs far outweigh any perceived benefits of engaging in terrorism. The deterrence message should be sent not only to terrorist organizations but also to states that sponsor them, nonstate actors that provide a front for their activities, and individuals who may contemplate joining or supporting them. The goal of deterring terrorism supports the strategic aim of abolishing it by convincing individuals, organizations, and states to seek alternate methods of political change because terrorism is no longer a viable option. Providing a deterrence message to each of the four audiences associated with terrorism requires:

Deterring terrorist organizations. Terrorist organizations believe that they can conduct operations with impunity. Capabilities, particularly improved intelligence, should be acquired to detect, thwart, and destroy such groups and bring their members to justice. Actions should be taken to create certainty that terrorists will be captured and imprisoned rather than becoming martyrs for their cause. Political, social, and religious leaders must understand that their organizations will be destroyed if they choose terrorism to advance their aims.

Deterring state actors. States must be deterred from providing support or sanctuary to terrorist organizations. This can be done by broadening international norms against terrorism and demonstrating the resolve to replace the leadership of any state that continues to sponsor terrorism. States must clearly understand that the costs will far outweigh any perceived benefits of engaging in acts of terrorism.

Detering nonstate actors. Nonstate actors must be deterred from providing aid and assistance to terrorist organizations. This can be achieved by establishing an international environment of greater financial transparency, “naming and shaming” organizations involved in terrorist support, and lowering barriers to asset seizures and freezing of funds.

Detering individuals. Efforts to deter individuals from joining or supporting terrorist organizations include educating potential recruits on the sinister nature of specific organizations and of terrorism in general, dispelling the notion that terrorism results in positive gain, and demonstrating that terrorists will be brought to justice.

Although some believe that terrorists are undeterrable, a strong argument can be made to the contrary. Without question, state and nonstate actors can be deterred from providing assistance. The tougher challenge applies to the actual terrorist organizations and their followers. Deterrence of these will take time. The bottom line is that terrorists must believe that ultimately their efforts would be futile.

Diminishing the Underlying Causes

Efforts to diminish the underlying causes of terrorism comprise the third element of the 3-D Strategy of Abolishment. Through an aggressive long-term campaign, the United States and its allies should mitigate the underlying conditions that foster the formation of terrorist groups and their support elements. To do this, the United States and its allies should directly or indirectly engage vulnerable regions and disparate ideologies and peoples.

The major contributors to the underlying causes of terrorism are:

- economic and social inequity in societies marked by both abject poverty and conspicuous affluence
- poor governance and economic stagnation or decline that alienates many segments of a state’s population
- illiteracy and lack of education that lead to widespread ignorance about the modern world and resentment toward Western values
- U.S. foreign policies, particularly regarding the Middle East, that have caused widespread resentment toward America.

To mitigate these underlying causes, the United States should renew efforts to remind the international community that America stands not only against terrorism but also for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for all peoples of the world. The following actions are necessary to address the underlying causes of terrorism:

- increase foreign development assistance and use it to promote accountable and participatory governance along with an environment favorable to sustained economic growth
- promote literacy and education in the Islamic world and underdeveloped nations
- engage in information operations to denigrate the concept of terrorism and discredit supporting ideology
- reenergize U.S. efforts for peace and stability in the Middle East.

Defending the Homeland

While the United States engages in overseas activities to combat terrorism, it should simultaneously defend the homeland. The United States faces an enemy with a steadfast determination to disrupt the American way of life and undermine the safety and security of U.S. citizens everywhere. On the home front, the United States should remain vigilant and ready by establishing collaborative relationships between Federal agencies, law enforcement, public health and emergency management

entities, professional associations, and private partners. To that end, the United States should use every power available to defend the homeland against terrorist attack while executing its overarching offensive strategy to abolish terrorism. The United States should be postured to provide an effective defense in three areas:

Prevent terrorist attacks. To the maximum extent possible, would-be terrorists and the weapons they intend to use must be denied entry into the United States. Weapons of mass destruction must be detected and intercepted before they can be employed. Collaboration at all levels of government, along with private sector and individual citizens, is essential to disrupting terrorist aims.

Protect critical assets. To minimize the probability of a successful terrorist strike in the homeland, the United States should fortify critical infrastructure and other potential terrorist targets.

Prepare responses. To reduce the impact of terrorism, the United States should be prepared to mitigate the consequences of an attack. This is particularly critical when responding to attacks from weapons of mass destruction. Again, collaboration among all agencies at the Federal, state, and local level is essential.

The United States should be safe and secure at home to preserve its way of life, maintain economic growth and stamina, and remain engaged in the international effort against terrorism. Without an effective defense, the United States might be driven to focus on matters at home, allowing terrorists to continue operating on a global scale.

Conclusion

The 3-D Strategy of Abolishment is a long-term initiative likely to take years—and possibly decades—to achieve ultimate victory. America possesses not only the vision and strength to see this effort to fruition but also the moral imperative to lead a global partnership of nations. Innocent individuals must not live in terror of being held hostage, harmed, or killed as a means of furthering the goals of radical organizations. This country has proven its resolve to defend liberty and secure freedom time and time again. An international strategy of such magnitude demands the leadership of the only nation capable of exercising that leadership—the United States of America.

Combating Terrorism in a Globalized World

Strategic Landscape

We will direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to the disruption and defeat of the global terror network. ⁴

—George W. Bush
September 20, 2001

America has arguably been at war with terrorists for over a decade. However, it was not until September 11, 2001, that the United States realized the magnitude of the war. The conflict had been building since the 1983 Marine Corps barracks bombing in Lebanon, and while a few keen analysts saw the confrontation coming, most did not. Contemporary theorists had postulated a concept called fourth generational warfare in which distinctions are blurred between war and peace, civilian and military, and nation-states and transnational groups.⁵ The global war on terrorism fits squarely in this concept, with the adversary using asymmetrical capabilities in surprising ways to devastating effect. The United States now understands the severity of this threat, particularly when coupled with weapons of mass destruction. With national security clearly at risk, America possesses the resolve, patience, and might to combat terrorism wherever it exists. Any strategy developed to counter the threat of terrorism should not only defeat existing terrorist organizations but also take a longer-term view to deter future acts of terrorism and address underlying causes.

The 3-D Strategy of Abolishment is a comprehensive grand strategy designed to combat terrorism on a number of levels, both unilaterally and multilaterally. It embodies a proactive strategy consistent with our national ideals and interests. While individual acts of terrorism may never be completely eliminated, terrorism must become anathema to civilized societies. This grand strategy integrates all elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—to achieve the strategic aim of abolishing terrorism as a viable tool for social or political change.

This paper begins with a broad overview of the main trends in the strategic landscape that has given rise to global terrorism, followed by a more detailed analysis of the transnational, interconnected nature of today's terrorist groups and their centers of gravity. The strategic aim is then presented along with justification to address terrorism at all levels, from global to state-level. Following the strategic aim are the elements of strategy, which include defeating existing terrorist organizations, deterring future acts of terrorism, and diminishing the underlying causes. Although not an element of the 3-D Strategy of Abolishment, defending America's homeland is discussed to highlight the importance of integrating homeland defense with the offensive effort to combat terrorism.

As a grand strategy, the abolishment of terrorism is a broad vision that provides a critical philosophical link between national-level objectives and departmental-level strategies. In that regard, this paper integrates each element of the strategy to create the broad vision, while each chapter is written in a stand-alone manner to facilitate development of supporting strategies and objectives.

Global Trends

The terrorist attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center was a significantly more deadly manifestation of several trends that have occurred in the post-Cold War era. As such, it was not a watershed event that signaled the start of a new international era. Terrorists have always had evil intentions. On September 11, 2001, they demonstrated the capability to carry out their deadly intent anywhere in the world with greater effect.

Countering terrorist capabilities requires a reexamination of the strategic landscape and the U.S. response to it. The United States has been forced to review national interests and reevaluate national security strategies as a result of September 11, 2001. Three major trends that have had overwhelming influence on the strategic landscape deserve mention:

- Collapse of the bipolar system
- Resurgence of globalism
- Rise of Islamic radicalism

The confluence of these trends has enabled many nations to enjoy relative peace, stability, and increasing prosperity. These trends also present many challenges. They have created a strong backlash against what are seen by some societies as increasing homogeneity among nations and cultures that threaten to overwhelm and destroy traditional local values. These trends have also lifted terrorism to a global scale. In this light, the United States should reevaluate its grand strategy. But to arrive at such a comprehensive strategy, these trends should be analyzed in depth.

Collapse of the Bipolar System

While sometimes violent, the bipolar nature of the Cold War created a sense of geopolitical stability that was rare in modern history. The threat of mutual annihilation modulated the actions of both superpowers. Bipolarity also dampened nationalistic tendencies around the world because each superpower feared that a small engagement by proxy states would boil over into a nuclear showdown. Each superpower weighed its actions, and the actions of states with their respective spheres of influence, against the likely reaction of the countervailing superpower.

The United States and Soviet Union succeeded in preventing global war while fighting numerous proxy wars. Though several countries did erupt into civil war and social unrest, conflicts remained largely local or regional in scope. In fact, the overwhelming majority of conflicts since 1945 have been struggles inside national boundaries.⁶

With the fall of the Soviet system, established patterns began to crumble. Countries in the Soviet sphere of influence began to chart their own strategic courses and other regions of the world were no longer part of the bipolar competition for influence. The collapse of the Soviet economy forced the military to disengage from distant commitments. Though Soviet disengagement from Europe occurred relatively peacefully, the disintegration of the communist system led to intrastate and internal wars in parts of the Soviet Union itself.

The collapse of communism, coupled with the economic contraction during the transition to free markets, accelerated the sale of military equipment, flooding a market already awash with relatively cheap weapon systems. These systems fueled conflicts all over the globe. Soviet-era weapons

found their way into the hands of smugglers, narcoterrorists, resistance movements, and terrorist organizations.

The collapse of the bipolar system thus created three main problems for the United States. First, the trend toward internal conflicts accelerated after the fall of the Soviet Union. Bitter, ethnic rivalries were renewed, thereby increasing the number of conflicts. Increasing global fragmentation stressed the international system and challenged U.S. interest for global stability.⁷ Secondly, as suggested above, additional weapons from the Soviet Union and other former Warsaw Pact countries were dumped into a large illegal arms market, further enabling separatists and terrorists alike. Thus, the potential for terrorists gaining access to weapons of mass destruction or fissile material presents a major challenge for U.S. world leadership.⁸

While it is believed that weapons of mass destruction have so far eluded the grasp of criminal and terrorist organizations, the lure of the market is ever present.⁹ Despite growing international efforts to track nuclear material, these materials could fall into terrorist hands. Moreover, well-financed terrorist organizations could lure cash-poor rogue scientists away from their struggling governments. Indeed, many give credence to this scenario in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.¹⁰

Resurgence of Globalization

Globalization increased dramatically in the 1990s. The United States has the diplomatic, military, and economic wherewithal to benefit from this development. This enviable position makes America a symbol of the negative aspects of globalization and a target for terrorist organizations and rival states.

Diplomatically, the United States continues to encourage greater democratization throughout the world.¹¹ This strategy has generally worked well, especially in countries where democratic or near-democratic institutions existed in the past. Nations without these traditions, particularly states with a history of authoritarian regimes, find it difficult to make the transition.

Nascent democracies face a constant dilemma. With tremendous economic challenges and no democratic traditions, it has been difficult to succeed in both areas simultaneously. As the controls were lifted, there were no economic systems to replace them. These new democracies inherited economies that were dysfunctional and not competitive in free global markets, and have found the combination of political and economic freedom difficult to sustain. For instance, government turnover has frequently obstructed steady economic or democratic improvement, and, at times, segments of the former authoritarian regimes have been voted back into office. Too often, voters chose stability over immediate or extensive economic reform in nascent democracies. The price for this stability, however, may be the loss of the public domestic discourse essential in providing an outlet for dissatisfaction. If the dissatisfaction continues over long periods of time, it can become a breeding ground for exploitation by terrorist organizations.

A key factor holding many nations back is the lack of effective governance, rule of law, and the basic state institutions required for viable open-market economies that will attract foreign investment. The result leaves many nations developing more slowly and falling behind the rest of the world. Instability and lack of economic opportunity causes widespread emigration, especially among those who have marketable skills. Over time a "brain drain" develops, leaving behind less qualified people to rebuild damaged institutions. The absence of institutions creates illiteracy and crime and breeds generations of lawlessness. People in struggling nations have little hope of creating functional institutions that are able to bring order and foster prosperity.

The United States and its business community are among the leaders of global economic expansion. In some regions there is a strong desire to reap the benefits of American capitalism and

globalization; however, the image of American military and economic omnipotence is simultaneously respected and resented. America is seen as the driving force behind globalization that is threatening a way of life. Fear of cultural dilution is widespread, especially among traditionalist cultures. The lure of not only American goods but also of American attitudes plays well among the world's young, causing generational tensions never previously experienced by their societies. This Americanization of cultures is seen as a threat.

These tensions foster tremendous resentment that is exploited by many opportunistic groups. Anger and frustration, when combined with a sense of hopelessness, create a volatile mix. When cheap weapons and weak, unresponsive governments are added, the results can be a devastating struggle over meager resources between the "haves" and the "have nots." These struggles remain largely at the local or regional level. However, global terrorists can exploit unrest and adopt issues to gain support.¹² Global terrorist groups aim dissatisfied societal groups at global targets. Often the target is the United States.

Perhaps the most salient development of globalization has been the rise of information technology (IT). Information technology accelerates human interaction at an unprecedented rate, delivering foreign cultural images all over the world. Information technology instantaneously brings the most open society in the world to every corner of the globe for review and criticism.

The United States leads the information revolution and the content of the global information network. As a result, the United States is a model for societies and a beacon of hope for some, while at the same time it resembles a model of excess to others. In some cultures, the United States is used as a convenient scapegoat, since a country's elite cannot justify or accurately explain American prosperity in the face of their own condition. The scope and diversity of American society is tremendously bewildering to many isolated cultures, where elites may explain to illiterates that the United States is evil.¹³ Most elites in the developing world find many aspects of U.S. culture attractive and seek to emulate them. A few, however, blame external, largely American influences for their inability to address the challenges of globalization. In repressive or tradition-bound societies, one reaction is to revert to traditions of an idealized past. The more threatened these elites feel, the more strident are their views. The failure of ruling elites to meet social needs attracts the dispossessed to rival causes. Thus, a vicious cycle of anger and frustration is created in countries bombarded with U.S. cultural, economic, and religious images, and where half the population may be under 20 years of age and confronting an uncertain future.¹⁴

The IT revolution also denies governments customary means of control. In authoritarian nation-states, state-run information networks compete with new technologies that erode government control and offer greater access to new ideas. As information technology pries open such societies, governments face new challenges to their power.

A byproduct of the IT revolution is that groups with access to modest information technology can project their political agendas while circumventing government censure or control. Moreover, nongovernmental groups can transcend traditional boundaries of nation-states. This can be seen in a positive light, as populations have access to otherwise censored ideas. For instance, the ability to project ideas of democracy and freedom to the former Soviet bloc was one instrument for change within Central and Eastern Europe in the last decade.¹⁵ On a more negative note, groups with IT access can create the conditions for government reaction and overreaction. Within countries and regions with strong, open, and democratic traditions, such groups contribute to a broad and open debate. In weaker authoritarian regimes, where no such mechanisms are in place, such groups can cause instability and unrest as the populace is exposed to new information and questions government credibility.

In sum, information technology has highlighted the gulf between the haves and the have nots. Technology also has enabled individuals and groups to challenge governments and regimes. While information technology is helping the United States encourage democracy and open markets across the world, at the same time it enables terrorism to be delivered to U.S. shores.

Rise of Islamic Radicalism

As one of the world's largest religions, Islam is practiced by nearly one-fifth of the world's population. Economically, politically, and culturally, Muslims represent a diverse group throughout the world. Like any large group, there are tremendous variations in the actual practice of Islam. It is a highly decentralized religion that has no central authority or ruling body to interpret the guiding principles of the Koran. Consequently, religious interpretation is left up to the clergy at the local or regional level, allowing them to filter the Koran's message through different cultural lenses.¹⁶

Islam's adaptive nature has given rise to many sects throughout the Muslim world. Some sects rule governments. Some governments allow other religions to practice freely. A few are fundamentalist, operating within the strictest interpretations of *Shar'ia* or Islamic law and forbidding the practice of any religion except their version of Islam. Indeed, some are radically more extreme, saving their most vehement opposition for opposing Muslim sects, branding them as traitors to the pure and true faith. One example is the brutal campaign waged by the Taliban against segments of the Shiite population of Afghanistan.¹⁷

The current rise of radical groups has been facilitated by globalization. Where they have seized power, for example in Afghanistan, they have promised a return to more traditional religious practices to uplift the population.¹⁸ Their strident, anti-Western rhetoric garners many followers, especially in isolated and undereducated portions of the world. With the advent of global information technologies, these ideas cut both ways. Both secular and radical groups have used information technologies to amplify their message with good success and to undercut government initiatives. Muslim-based governments will continue to struggle with strict interpretations of *Shar'ia* and increasing globalization.

Rise of Global Terrorism

The trends described in this chapter combine to give rise to the phenomenon known as global terrorism. Fueled by resentment of Western societies, aided by global communications, and driven by radicalism, global terrorists have formed lethal and highly dangerous organizations able to operate worldwide. The phenomenon of global terrorism is complex, requiring this study to devote the next chapter for its review.

Global terrorists have declared war on the United States and its allies. Though September 11, 2001, seems to be a watershed event for the American public, the conditions that gave rise to global terrorism were created over several decades. Terrorism is as old as conflict itself, but today's technology enables terrorists to carry out their intentions on a global scale.

To develop a strategy to combat terrorism, the United States should first clearly see the world as it exists today and establish a set of assumptions. It should correctly analyze the threat, then develop ends, ways, and means not only to combat terrorism but also to reduce its allure by advancing the universal principles that civilized nations embrace and to offer hope to much of the world. This study intends to provide detailed analysis of the threat that the United States and the world faces today, as well as a dynamic strategy intended to effectively counter 21st-century terrorism.

Terrorism in the 21st Century

*Terrorism takes us back to ages we thought were long gone if we allow it a free hand to corrupt democratic societies and destroy the basic rules of life. Terrorism has become the systematic weapon of a war that knows no borders or seldom has a face.*¹⁹

—Jacques Chirac
September 24, 1983

A New Kind of War

In the hours following the attack on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, George W. Bush stated, “This is a new kind of war.”²⁰ Although the events of September 11, 2001, saw terrorism produce its most destructive event to date, trends from the preceding decade indicated an ever-increasing trajectory of violence. As the next in a long line of increasingly destructive terrorist attacks, there is a tendency to see nothing new about this attack except the magnitude of destruction. The difference, however, is more than magnitude, and America is just beginning to realize the enormity of the terrorist threat that is confronting all of civilized society in the 21st century.

New are the motives behind 21st-century terrorism. Globalization has enabled worldwide terrorism, and it has facilitated worldwide goals. Rather than using terrorism to create change within a single society or focus on a specific government, terrorism has gone international to support global causes, and America has become one of its primary targets. These terrorists are backed by powerful organizations located throughout the world and have achieved a de facto sovereign status by acquiring the means to conduct war—and have in fact declared war—posing a significant military and foreign policy challenge for which the United States has no preplanned response. With global motives, global capabilities, and the use of weapons of mass effect, this really is a new kind of war. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld indicated, it requires a new strategy, “one that is broad-based and a sustained effort.”²¹ The challenge, therefore, is to define clearly this new kind of war and associated threats in a manner that leads to an effective strategy.

The Changing Nature of Terrorism

While this war has been labeled the Global War on Terrorism, terrorism does not fully describe the challenge for America and the world. According to the Joint Military Doctrine of the United States, *terrorism* is “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological.”²² However, this definition does not seem to describe fully the attacks on September 11, 2001. In the traditional characterization of terrorism, terrorists hope to create fear and

then use that fear as leverage to intimidate governments into making concessions in line with the terrorists' political goals.²³

For the September 11, 2001, attacks, no one openly claimed credit and no one made demands. Instead, those responsible for the attacks see themselves as warriors for Muhammad, fighting a holy war of jihad.²⁴ Terrorism has traditionally been viewed as a crime, rather than an act of war; in this case, however, war has been declared on America. The September 11, 2001, attacks were the latest in a series to carry out the *fatwa* issued in 1998 by Osama bin Laden. The *fatwa* stated:

The duty to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque (Mecca) from their grip, and in order for their armies to move off of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God.²⁵

Consequently, those individuals who carried out the attacks see all Westerners as infidels and combatants. They saw no innocents when the World Trade Center collapsed. The term terrorism also fails to address the fact that many Arab and Muslim hearts and minds have been swayed to their cause, and continues to be a major focus of their effort.²⁶ They are trying not only to coerce or intimidate governments or societies but also to create an environment that unites a larger Muslim population against Western ideals and societies. Thus, the world is not seeing traditional terrorism, but rather a global insurgency, indeed, a pansurgency aimed at ultimately altering the global balance of power. *Pansurgency* is an organized movement of nonstate actors aimed at the overthrow of values, cultures, or societies on a global level through the use of subversion and armed conflict, with the ultimate goal of *establishing a new world order*.

The goal of an insurgency is to overthrow the established system of government. Insurgents conduct terrorism to discredit their nation's government. Then, they conduct guerrilla warfare to wear down the military forces that engage them. Simultaneously, they build sympathies with the surrounding populations to establish areas of sanctuary and receive support.²⁷ Mao Zedong's dictum for victory was, "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue."²⁸

The goal of a pansurgency is similar but on a grander scale. The globe is the pansurgent's battlefield and the goals are international in nature. Pansurgents are similar, engaging in worldwide acts of terrorism to discredit those in international positions of power, then engaging in asymmetrical warfare and guerrilla tactics to wear down their adversaries, and ultimately swaying large populations to their cause. Ho Chi Minh recognized how protracted an insurgency could be and consequently stated, "You will kill ten of our men, and we will kill one of yours, and in the end it will be you who tire of it."²⁹ Historically, insurgencies have been protracted—this pansurgency will likely be protracted as well. This new kind of war, however, may present a conflict more grim than Ho Chi Minh described. Indeed, it could be a very tough war.

Interconnected Terrorist Organizations

The concept of a pansurgency applies not to a single terrorist organization but collectively to many terrorist organizations throughout the world. These organizations have established a global, interconnected network of operations that often provides mutual aid and support in which it is difficult to isolate a particular group or faction without drawing linkages to other organizations that provide direct support, indirect assistance, or pursue similar goals. Terrorist organizations, ranging from those with global reach to local influence, support one another in an interconnected fashion.

Terrorist organizations appear to operate on three levels. The lowest level, which is the least threatening to the international community as a whole, are terrorist organizations that operate at the state level or within the confines of a single country. Next are those that operate at the regional level and have operations that transcend at least one international boundary. The third level includes terrorist organizations that operate globally, conducting activities that span several regions and have goals that can be achieved only by engaging in an international manner. Each is explained in detail below.

Global Terrorists: Drawing on information in the Department of State report, *Patterns of Global Terrorism—2001*, six terrorist groups clearly fall into this category:

- Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
- Al-Gama's al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)
- Hizballah (Party of God)
- Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)
- Mujahedin-e Kalq Organization (MEK)
- Al Qaeda.

These six groups are at the heart of the pansurgency.³⁰ Each is a radical, Islamic-based organization that supports the creation of an Islamist Palestinian state in place of Israel and the elimination of U.S. influence in all of the Middle East. Some of these groups advocate establishing a new world order under extremist Muslim views. These groups operate in a truly global fashion, with support networks spanning the world. Collectively, they have the ability to strike targets in virtually any country, and their ideological goals threaten security interests beyond their region. With modern communication technology, such as the Internet, and the ability to move freely in open societies, theirs is a "virtual nation," which possesses many of the instruments of power, including informational, military, and economic means. Radical Islamic beliefs and a common abhorrence of Western culture tie these organizations together.


Regional Terrorists: While these terrorists focus on issues within their own region and draw much of their support from surrounding nations, they are nevertheless interconnected with terrorist groups at both the global and state levels. The international community is just now beginning to recognize how interconnected these terrorist groups have become. They are linked by more than mere sympathy for one another's causes; their mutual support extends to sharing financial, informational, and technological support when it is mutually beneficial to do so. Regional terrorists, while less threatening to the United States than global terrorists, remain a significant concern to the international community and must be defeated in a manner that is integrated with actions being taken against global terrorist groups.

State Terrorists: These terrorists operate within the confines of a single country and are, therefore, the responsibility of the applicable government. Even state terrorist organizations, however, have been known to support regional and global terrorist groups. For example, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone is believed to have sold diamonds to Al Qaeda, which resells them at a profit. This arrangement benefits both Al Qaeda and the RUF, and it establishes a relationship for future support. Once again, a pattern of interconnectedness and mutual dependence emerges.

Terrorist organizations are linked together in two distinct ways. The first is through *hard links* in which there is direct interaction and cooperation among terrorist groups. These links can be detected, analyzed, and acted upon. The second is through *soft links*, which are difficult to detect or influence.

Hard Links: Terrorist organizations work together when it is in their interest to do so. These organizations may have different ideologies, goals, adversaries, or sponsors, but there may be compelling reasons to cooperate. The following describes some of the hard links identified among terrorist organizations:

Figure 1: **Interconnected Terrorist Organizations**



Financial support: This occurs in many forms, from direct financial transfers to engaging in such mutually beneficial business deals as illegal drug trafficking or diamond sales, charitable organizations that funnel money to terrorist groups and legitimate businesses that launder money from illicit sources.

Sharing intelligence: Terrorist organizations sometimes share information regarding U.S. and allied military operations, critical vulnerabilities, intelligence gathering methods, counterterrorism capabilities, and political activities. They share information to maintain situational awareness and improve the fidelity of their terrorist planning.

Coordinating activities: Terrorist organizations have coordinated their efforts to maximize the psychological impact of terrorist operations or to demonstrate the ability to conduct sustained operations over time.


Sharing safe havens: A number of terrorist organizations operate training camps and maintain bases of operations near one another. Safe havens have been shared by like-minded terrorist organizations, taking advantage of governments willing to sponsor them.

Sharing materials and resources: Terrorists exchange technology to construct bombs and the techniques to employ them. Key materials also are shared among some terrorist organizations. This becomes particularly worrisome as terrorist organizations pursue weapons of mass destruction.

Sharing personnel: Closely linked terrorist organizations share personnel for training or intelligence purposes or to develop a key capability within the organization such as encrypted or encoded communications, falsifying documents, or traveling incognito.

Soft Links: This category attempts to characterize the manner in which terrorist organizations operate without direct communication or coordination. Although difficult to delineate, the following attempts to capture the concept of soft links:

Figure 2: Spectrum of Terrorism



Sharing opportunities: As one organization strikes, other organizations may take advantage of an emerging opportunity. For example, while the United States was coping with the events of September 11, 2001, a terrorist or terrorist organization sent anthrax through the mail system, displaying the ability to strike with effectiveness despite heightened defense postures or a desire to shift blame for an attack onto an unrelated terrorist group.

Sharing responsibility: One terrorist organization may commit an act of terrorism while another organization claims responsibility. This may serve to confuse retaliation measures, cloak those who are truly responsible, and draw attention to the terrorist organization that elected to claim responsibility.

Public diplomacy: Some terrorist organizations have access to or are able to influence broad-reaching media mechanisms to communicate rationale or support for other terrorist organization activities.

Sharing ideological views: Ideological leaders associated with a particular terrorist organization or a specific country sponsoring terrorism may communicate support of other terrorist organization activities or incite demonstrations supporting specific causes or opposing common foes.

In the aggregate, these hard and soft links work together to create a spectrum of terrorism that ranges from state-level terrorist organizations seeking to modify their government's behavior to global terrorists—such as Al Qaeda—with worldwide hegemonic goals, ultimately striving to replace Western culture with their radical view of Islam. This spectrum is illustrated in figure 2.

Although terrorism at the global level poses the gravest threat to the United States and the global community, it is supported by terrorist organizations at lower levels. These lines are not sharp, and the international response may require a myriad of responses at every level. Due to linkages along this spectrum, however, any viable strategy should embrace an integrated approach.

Terrorists as Pansurgents

The term *terrorism* describes a particularly heinous methodology that is used to create or cause change within a society. It is a political tool directed at achieving a specific end through the deliberate targeting of noncombatants. In other words, terrorism is an activity that groups and individuals engage in—it is a term that describes what they *do*, not who they *are*.

Before September 11, 2001, terrorism was viewed as a tool used primarily by insurgents and, to a lesser extent, by organized crime and disgruntled individuals. A great deal of literature has been written on why insurgencies arise, how they go about creating change, and how to combat them. The focus is invariably on organizations attempting to create change within a single society or a single country. There has been virtually no discussion about nonstate actors working globally to create change across international boundaries and across societies. Such pansurgency is a new phenomenon. Globalization has enabled organizations to interact on an international level, afforded the mechanisms to influence vast populations, and provided the capabilities to lash out at distant governments. Al Qaeda and others who are responsible for the attack on America, along with the states, organizations, and other terrorist groups who supported them, collectively are pansurgents who desire directly or indirectly to alter the global balance of power to establish a new world order, principally under a radical Islamic rule.

Viewing global terrorists as pansurgents allows a greater degree of clarity on several issues yet to be resolved in the war on terrorism. International terrorism has historically been viewed as a crime, with law enforcement agencies taking the lead in countering the threat and the judicial system trying and convicting the perpetrators. The situation at hand, however, clearly transcends this conventional approach. The threat is broad and complex. The six groups that form the core of the pansurgency are intertwined with a host of cooperating organizations throughout the world, along with governments sympathetic to their cause. Law enforcement, even at the international level, cannot fully engage the threat. It requires a broad range of actions, including military force and other political, informational, and economic efforts to defeat the global terrorists, undercut their recruitment base, and attempt to address the sources of rage.

The threat is more than crime, but it is also less than formal war. Those responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks have declared war on the United States by calling for a jihad, or holy war, with all Americans and Westerners seen as infidels and therefore legitimate targets. If this were a formal war, then the terrorists would be elevated in stature to combatants with arguably all of the rights and privileges accorded them under the Geneva Convention. Furthermore, the targets of the attack on America could be construed as a “key national military command center” and a “critical economic control node” rather than an attack on innocent civilians and noncombatants at the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. Even if America did declare war, against whom would war be declared? For the same reasons a nation does not declare war against itself when combating an insurgency, the international community has no basis on which to declare a formal war on a pansurgency.

These and similar implications suggest that terrorists cannot be considered legitimate combatants, but neither can they be viewed as mere criminals. When viewed through the lens of a pansurgency, it becomes clear that they should be considered *global insurrectionists* who deserve neither the legal protection of criminals nor the combatant status of military members. The closest existing term is *war criminal* because they are pursuing an illegitimate war, both in cause and conduct. Their barbaric acts of terrorism cut across many international boundaries and governmental jurisdictions. As such, this rebellion defies existing labels, definitions, and rules. The international community will need to develop innovative approaches and new conventions if the pansurgency is going to be dealt with effectively.

Characterizing the Pansurgency

While there is no single end state that reflects the goal of every terrorist organization everywhere, the six major terrorist groups operating on a global level all possess a similar vision and provide the ideological basis for this pansurgency. Their view of victory is to establish radical Islamist regimes in the Middle East and Central Asia initially, and then to diminish or eliminate U.S. and Western influence in the Middle East and the Islamic world. Some, such as Al Qaeda, even hope to achieve a position of global dominance. In other words, they seek to alter the international balance of power. These global terrorist groups are often supported by regional and local terrorist organizations, even though these may have nothing to do with the radical Islamic movement. Terrorists leverage one another's strengths, which enable them to pursue their own agendas. Because these groups are willing to work together even when ideologies differ, terrorist organizations across the spectrum of terrorism can be viewed holistically as a pansurgency. As such, those who engage in terrorism and those who support it collectively pose a serious threat to the United States and allies.

Key Objectives: In an effort to alter the global balance of power, the six groups that are the core of the pansurgency have four near-term objectives, which are to:

- destroy Israel and remove infidels from the Middle East
- unite the Islamic World against the United States and non-Muslim cultures
- obtain weapons of mass destruction for both their status value and coercive power³¹
- establish a new regional and global balance of power favorable to those possessing a radical view of Islam.

These objectives serve to consolidate a power base from which the pansurgents can overthrow governments and replace them with radical Islamic regimes.

Pansurgency Strategy

The overall strategy of global terrorist groups recognizes that they are in an inferior power position and must strike asymmetrically while garnering sympathies from other terrorist organizations, governments aligned against the West, and the larger Islamic population. The objectives of this strategy are to:

- demonstrate to the Islamic world that terrorists are willing to take the war to the United States in an effort to elevate ideological prestige and heighten sympathy for their cause
- draw the United States and Western forces into the region to engage in protracted guerrilla-type warfare
- unite Muslim factions against coalition forces
- win the hearts and minds of the Islamic people
- incite worldwide insurgencies to overthrow Western ideals and replace them with a new world order under radical views of Islam.

No specific deadlines or timetables are provided because, from their perspective, time is on their side. Now that the United States has been drawn into the region, instability and acts of terrorism elsewhere in the Middle East may cause deeper U.S. and Western engagement as instability spreads. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular, is being exploited along these lines.

In support of this pansurgency, terrorist groups have adopted a transnational strategy, characterized by its global, protracted, diffuse, decentralized, complex, and ideological attributes. Buttressing the strategy are a sophisticated exploitation of modern media and technology, telecommunications, antiglobalization sentiments, indoctrination techniques, and a recruitment pool of disenfranchised Muslims. Terrorists aim for support from both active participants, who plan and conduct highly

compartmentalized terrorist operations, and passive sympathizers, whose silence does not betray or impede the pansurgents. Appeals to the masses are effective in broadening passive support, as well as gaining “troops” whose orders to fight may take them to a variety of terrorist battlefields, such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kashmir, Chechnya, or the Philippines. Furthermore, global terrorism has been highly successful in influencing the intelligentsia of the Muslim world, whose passive support is particularly critical in thwarting intelligence efforts and whose active support provides executive leadership, financial backing, and ideological legitimacy.

A variety of techniques help garner popular support for global terrorism:

- the charismatic attraction of a figure such as Osama bin Laden
- esoteric appeals based on ideological claims and societal grievances
- demonstrations of military potency that exploit Western vulnerabilities to asymmetric methods
- terrorist actions targeted at provoking American and allied responses that can be portrayed as repressive and illegitimate.

The limited need for coercion reflects the extent of popular voluntary support for global terrorism.

Personal, social, political-cultural, and religious causes for disunity are largely impervious to Western influence. As a result, the United States will have to depend upon moderate Islamic leaders and opinion makers to discredit terrorist organizations’ interpretation of jihad in the eyes of Muslim adherents. Strategic and tactical sources of disunity are more vulnerable to coalition actions aimed at the global terrorists’ centers of gravity. America should disrupt terrorist ability to organize, plan, integrate, synchronize, and conduct future operations. This is a daunting task, given the scope and complexity of global terrorist organizations. Terrorist organizations are present in as many as 60 countries.³² The extensive network of schools and training camps will make it difficult to undermine terrorist support that has been building for several years. Terrorists have infiltrated certain state governments and institutions, where they mobilize support and extend their influence to all sectors and levels of societies. Thus, sustained and comprehensive efforts to disrupt cohesion and sources of external support—moral, political, material, and sanctuary—are vital to undermining the unity of global terrorism.

Pansurgency Centers of Gravity

Regardless of the type of terrorist organization being considered, each has essentially the same centers of gravity. These centers must be influenced in a manner that neutralizes the effects of the pansurgency. Destroying any one of these centers of gravity will significantly disrupt or cause the defeat of the terrorist organization.

Leadership: Leadership as a center of gravity is group-specific. Some terrorist groups are heavily dependent upon a charismatic leader, while others continue to function regardless of who is in command. Despite the “hydra-headed” effect some terrorist groups display, with many leaders in the wings able to step in as required, leadership should nevertheless be regarded as a center of gravity.

A prime example is Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network. During the 1980s, resistance fighters in Afghanistan developed a global terrorist recruitment and support network with the aid of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other states. After the 1989 Soviet withdrawal, Osama bin Laden assumed control of this network, which he named Al Qaeda (“The Base”). Al Qaeda equipped, trained, and funded thousands of Muslim fighters to commit acts of terror in support of Osama bin Laden’s extremist Islamic views. Understanding the role of leadership as a center of gravity requires an examination of the development, organization, and resilience of the Al Qaeda network.

Osama bin Laden’s worldview was shaped by Abdullah Azzam, the historical leader of Hamas, the most deadly Palestinian terrorist group.³³ Azzam and Prince Turki bin Faisal bin Abdelaziz, chief

of security of Saudi Arabia, were bin Laden's early mentors. Later, Ayman Zawahiri, an Egyptian physician, became his religious mentor. In 1982–1984, Azzam founded Maktab al Khidmat lil-mujahidin al-Arab (Mak), also known as the Afghan Bureau. As Azzam's deputy and financier, Osama bin Laden traveled widely and raised several billion dollars of Western support; he also recruited several thousand Arab and Muslim young men to fight the Soviet Union. He received significant support from sources in Pakistan, especially the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), the Saudi and Egyptian governments, and the extensive Muslim Brotherhood network. Mak itself also developed independent sources of support through mosques and charities worldwide.

By 1987–1988, Osama bin Laden's relationship with Azzam soured due to Azzam's support for Ahmadshah Massoud, who led the Northern Alliance. Osama bin Laden instead preferred Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an Islamic Party leader who was both anticommunist and anti-Western.³⁴ Thus, when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden decided to form a group that could unite the whole Muslim world into a single entity. Working together until Azzam's assassination in September 1989, bin Laden proceeded to oppose the procommunist leader Najibullah in Kabul by strengthening Mak and channeling resources to other international pan-Islamic efforts where Muslims were perceived as victims. Having moved his infrastructure and fighters from Saudi Arabia to Sudan in 1989, where the National Islamic Front had assumed power, bin Laden now joined his organizations and stayed until 1996, when he was forced out of Sudan and returned to Afghanistan.

Al Qaeda is headed formally by Osama bin Laden, the emir-general, followed by a small core of three to four Al Qaeda leaders. It is linked informally with at least 24 constituent groups. Immediately below bin Laden is the Majlis al-Shura, a consultative council, which oversees four committees—military, religious-legal, finance, and media. To preserve operational effectiveness at all levels, compartmentalization and secrecy are paramount. Al Qaeda membership is estimated from 3,000 to 5,000 men, most who fought with the Taliban as the 55 Brigade. Support and operational cells have been identified in over 60 countries, including Somalia, Sudan, and the Philippines. Prior to his recent death, Mohammad Atef directed the commandos, mostly suicide bombers. Mohammad Mousa leads the Security Service. The impact of Atef's death is presumed to be highly significant in degrading operational readiness. There is reason to suspect that there are sleeper cells, populated by trained terrorists, awaiting reactivation in Europe and North America.

Fighting Al Qaeda poses numerous challenges, largely due to its dynamic structure and fluid operational methods. Although Osama bin Laden has stated that killing him will not weaken Al Qaeda, several rings of bodyguards, perhaps as many as 50 to 60, are known to guard him at all times through constant movement and protection. While adept at convincing others of their duty to enter Paradise, he apparently rejects this duty for himself.

Other reasons for Al Qaeda's resilience include its role as a symbol of resistance against Western domination. To achieve maximum support, Al Qaeda established the World Islamic Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders, thus ensuring a substantial base of recruits, supporters, and sympathizers. Furthermore, by embracing a pan-Islamic view, it draws support from the entire Muslim community, both Arab and non-Arab. By maintaining leadership and operational links with some of the most virulent Middle Eastern and Asian terrorist groups, Al Qaeda enjoys considerable strategic depth. Its physical and ideological penetration of the Islamic world further assures a strong base of support.

Although Al Qaeda is a daunting network—headed by a charismatic leader, linked with numerous terrorist groups known to possess global intent and reach, and supported by a diverse array of states, organizations, and, individuals—it is far from invincible. Eliminating Osama bin Laden, while not a “silver bullet” solution, is an important objective that will help disable Al Qaeda.

Ideology: The overarching ideology that undergirds this pansurgency focuses on power and seeks world domination. Terrorist groups around the world cooperate to achieve this goal. Yet few people, including the vast majority of Muslims, share the particular ideology that has spurred Al Qaeda to launch its bid for global power.

Islam, the religion of nearly one-fifth of the world's population, espouses revelations and interpretations contained in the Koran, Hadith, and Sunna. Muslims share a basic set of beliefs and practices. Muslims of different traditions, cultures, and nations, however, also vary in their interpretation and practice of Islam. As is true for the other revealed religions, Judaism and Christianity, there are fundamentalists and liberals in Islam. The Islamic faith is highly decentralized, allowing religious authorities wide latitude for individual interpretation. So absent a central authority to set doctrine, Muslims can legitimately claim that their particular interpretation is truly Islamic.

What Al Qaeda has done, however, is to violate Islam in a bid to lend legitimacy to its power grab. The main targets of Al Qaeda are not just Americans and their allies but also regimes in predominantly Muslim countries. Al Qaeda's ideological center of gravity is thus a distortion of Muslim belief and practice. As such, it is vulnerable to determined efforts by legitimate Islamic scholars, judges, and interpreters of the faith around the world who can counteract this violation of a great religion. In short, the way to defeat this center of gravity is by showing that there is nothing Islamic about Al Qaeda's power grab.

Finances: Like the leadership and ideology centers of gravity, funding for terrorist operations and networks provides a key source of strength. Cutting off a terrorist group's finances will significantly reduce its ability to execute its plans. How a terrorist group goes about raising funds, however, is an extremely complex process, most evident with the Al Qaeda organization. Here, clear evidence shows just how intertwined terrorist organizations are as they network in a true global fashion, providing mutual support and aid with like-minded terrorist organizations.

Al Qaeda financially supports many like-minded terrorist groups around the world. Individual Al Qaeda cells may be set up and initially funded by the main organization but otherwise are generally self-supporting.³⁵ These cells fund themselves through a variety of means including legitimate day jobs, counterfeiting, smuggling of cigarettes, drugs, and other items, credit card fraud, and identify theft. The three main sources of Al Qaeda money are numerous charity groups that do legitimate charity work but also channel money to terrorists (some knowingly, some unknowingly); direct donations from wealthy individuals; and illegal or black market trading in such commodities as opium, arms, or diamonds from Africa.

The most important source of funds is direct solicitations and charitable contributions. Al Qaeda launders its money four ways: simple cash movements and smuggling; the global banking system, especially under-regulated money laundering havens; the legitimate Islamic banking system; and the *hawala* system, which creates little or no paper trail.³⁶

Sanctuaries: States that sponsor terrorism provide safe havens that are critical to vigorous and sustained terrorist activities. Terrorist groups must possess sanctuaries in which they can plan activities, train members, practice operations, and marshal resources. While small groups can move about relatively freely in most Western states, parent organizations require safe havens with considerable latitude to operate without fear of disruption by adversaries.

Weak states sometimes seek support from terrorist organizations to bolster their power base and broaden their appeal among certain populations.³⁷ In return for support, the state may allow substantial freedom within its borders, provide financial support and permission to recruit from the state's population, and give credence to their ideological goals. There may be little a state would be unwilling to do if it perceived supporting a terrorist group was in its national interests.

Sanctuaries may also be provided by unwitting states plagued with extreme instability. States experiencing political unrest, civil disobedience, insurrections, economic failure, or environmental disasters are vulnerable to terrorist exploitation. If the government is exceptionally weak, terrorist groups may possess the capability to replace the government with one sympathetic to the group's cause, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan. Even if the government is not vulnerable to a terrorist-sponsored coup, terrorist groups can thrive in remote areas unhampered by governments focused on survival.

Removing these sanctuaries and forcing terrorist groups to operate in hostile territory will significantly hamper their freedom of action, perhaps to the point of paralysis. Without a base of operations, little can be done to orchestrate the many terrorist cells and groups that make up the global terrorist network. While this can be an exceptionally difficult center of gravity to affect, it may be the one that offers the swiftest results.

Command and Control Network: The same technologies that facilitate globalization have allowed terrorist groups to communicate and operate on a global level. The Internet in particular enables instantaneous communications between parent organizations and their distant and isolated terrorist cells.

Highly technical capabilities will be required to influence this center of gravity. Due to the high volume of traffic on the Internet, singling out specific e-mails would be problematic. Using commercially available cryptographic systems and further encoding the message with single-use code systems would make it exceptionally difficult to detect terrorist communications. Add to that procedures that call for frequent user identification changes and a technique called stenography, which buries messages in Web sites or pictures, and intercepting terrorist messages becomes nearly impossible.³⁸

The Internet is also being used to market several terrorist groups' religious views or ideology. Web sites display information on how support can be provided or where to send money. Members can also log onto Web sites to obtain moral support for their cause and receive updates on world events and how they affect the overall effort. By maximizing the use of the Internet, either through Web sites or e-mail, terrorist organizations can reach a large number of people at very little cost. This is extremely important since most legitimate media outlets are usually denied to terrorist organizations.

One of the greatest impacts of instantaneous communications provided by the Internet is the ability to maintain constant contact and situational awareness. As a result, key leaders remain constantly engaged and can take command of the organization relatively easily. This diminishes the ability to influence terrorist group leadership because no one is indispensable. In other words, exploitation of the Internet fosters the leadership hydra discussed above.

Implications for a Counterterrorism Strategy

Characterizing the threat of global terrorism as a pansurgency of interconnected terrorist organizations illustrates that this problem is larger than Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Consequently, focusing solely on the elimination of terrorist groups with global reach is shortsighted and destined to fail. A strategy of abolishment should address the following key issues to defeat the pansurgency threat:

- Establish an international, global environment where terrorism is an unacceptable means for social or political change.
- Address terrorist organizations at all levels of the spectrum, not just those operating at the global level.

- Unchecked, this pansurgency poses a grave threat to the security of the United States and its allies, particularly as weapons of mass destruction are acquired.
- When viewed from an ideological perspective, this pansurgency is similar to other ideological movements that opposed democracy, such as Nazism, Fascism, and Communism.
- States hostile to the United States or its allies will continue to support terrorism covertly as long as they perceive that benefits outweigh risks.
- An integrated strategy that employs all instruments of power should leverage coalition and allied capabilities to counter this broad and pervasive threat.
- The United States has a moral imperative and duty to defend democracy against this threat because it ultimately threatens peaceful and democratic societies everywhere.

In the aggregate, this threat requires a strategy that simultaneously leverages resources and capabilities of the United States and its partners against terrorist organizations that operate on all three levels—global, regional, and state. In the short term, the strategy should strike not only terrorist organizations but also those who support them. For the midterm, capabilities and mechanisms should be set in place that serve to deter individuals, organizations, and states from engaging in acts of terrorism. Over the long term, the supporting rationale and perceived need to engage in terrorism must be rooted out. An effective strategy should contain an overarching aim that seeks to make terrorism impractical and unproductive; the focus should be on terrorism as a methodology, rather than on limiting the effort to specific regions, certain types of terrorism, or conducted by a particular ethnic group. As Secretary Rumsfeld stated, the strategy should be broad-based and it should be a sustained effort.³⁹

Strategic Aim

*America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere. Yet, tens of thousands of trained terrorists are still at large. These enemies view the entire world as a battlefield, and we must pursue them wherever they are.*⁴⁰

—George W. Bush
January 29, 2002

The long-term strategic aim of abolishing terrorism seeks to end the practice of terrorism as a means to cause change within a society, government, or international community. The United States and the global community should never allow the threatening or harming of innocent people to further terrorist goals. Persistent and collective efforts of civilized nations should make the concept of terrorism completely illegitimate by removing the expectation of success for potential terrorists and those who support them.

Abolishing Terrorism as a Means for Change

The utterly barbaric practice of terrorism must be abolished through the concerted efforts of peaceful nations around the world—deliberately threatening or harming noncombatants must never be allowed to achieve political, ideological, or material gain. This is a long-term endeavor that is in the vital interest of free and democratic societies. This strategic aim is not focused solely on defeating existing terrorists but deterring future acts and resolving the underlying causes of terrorism.

The strategy to abolish terrorism seeks to develop the following end state, which is twofold: A global environment inhospitable to terrorism, established by a broad range of national and international mechanisms to deter and defeat terrorism; and a world free of organized terrorism as an instrument of societal change. Although acts of terror can never be wholly prevented, terrorism must be reduced to a level where it becomes an isolated, sporadic, criminal activity. Organized terrorism must never again be allowed to reach global proportions, threatening peaceful nations everywhere.

While there is no international consensus on the definition of terrorism, there is general agreement that the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations maintained by the Department of State is accurate. Determining which organizations belong on this list is both a moral and empirical judgment, based on the demonstrated activities of each terrorist organization and the values and sensibilities of civilized societies. Rarely is this decision based on an isolated incident but on observed behavior over time. Therefore, this strategy can still be executed in the absence of a specific and precise international definition as long as a general consensus can be obtained for the Department of State list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

Strategic Goals

The fight against terrorism will be lengthy and expensive. It will require the full commitment of the United States and its international partners to *defeat* existing terrorist organizations; *deter* individuals, organizations, and nations from supporting or engaging in acts of terrorism; and *diminish* the underlying causes of terrorism. The United States should accomplish these actions while maintaining the primary responsibility to *defend* U.S. citizens at home and abroad. The following outlines the strategic goals:

- Eliminate internationally organized terrorism and reduce other acts of terrorism within the boundaries of a single state.
- Develop, acquire, and maintain capabilities and mechanisms that deter individuals, organizations, and states from sponsoring or engaging in acts of terrorism.
- Determine the factors that cause terrorism and implement policies that reduce those factors, ultimately establishing an environment that views terrorism as impractical and unproductive.
- Provide effective defense measures to assure the security of U.S. citizens at home and abroad.

A Multidimensional Strategy


The fight against terrorism requires a multidimensional approach along the spectrum of terrorism, mainly through the collective efforts of the global community. All civilized societies must pool their diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capabilities to defeat terrorist organizations wherever they exist, to deter state and nonstate sponsorship of terrorist organizations, and to diminish the underlying causes of terrorism. This strategy calls upon states willing to combat terrorism, as well as regional and international organizations, private and public entities, and individuals, to partner together in the war against terrorism. From the largest superpower to the lone citizen, each has a role to play in combating terrorism, and each has a responsibility to share the burdens.

Leading the Global Effort: With its extensive technological, law enforcement, intelligence, and power projection capabilities, the United States will lead the overall effort against terrorist organizations that possess global reach. For those terrorist organizations posing a regional threat, the United States will facilitate coordination and provide support. At the state level, the United States will provide assistance for those states requesting additional capabilities to counter terrorist organizations within their boundaries. The United States will not lead the fight in every case but will lead where it makes sense and will support and assist as required when other nations or organizations are filling the leadership position. As figure 3 summarizes, America's resolve to defeat terrorism manifests itself at three levels—global, regional, and state—each of which is addressed in this strategy.

Global terrorists pose the greatest threat because they view the entire world as their battlefield. They draw upon resources from many nations and organizations and find sanctuaries and havens worldwide. With extensive support networks and financing, global terrorists are likely to obtain weapons of mass destruction. They may also use them, lacking any moral constraints. Global terrorists pose unique challenges as they expand their influence to numerous like-minded terrorist organizations. The common cause they make with individuals, organizations, and states creates a *virtual nation* spanning entire continents. The United States should be at the heart of the effort to defeat global terrorism because it has the means to employ all-source intelligence and project all instruments of national power wherever required.

Facilitating Regional Responses: The United States should encourage regional organizations to participate fully in the international effort to combat terrorism. As part of the multidimensional strategy, the United States should convince regional organizations to take significant steps to defeat existing regional terrorists, reinforce international mechanisms that serve to deter terrorism within their

Figure 3: **Burdensharing in a Multidimensional Strategy**



region, and work to identify and reduce the root causes of terrorism. Regional organizations play a critical role in endorsing United Nations (UN) resolutions and international protocols and tailoring them to the specific regional needs.

Many regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, have established positions on combating terrorism within their regions. The United States should encourage other organizations that can make substantial contributions by orchestrating counterterrorism responses within their membership, monitoring and reporting progress, and maintaining a high level of awareness. More capable organizations can establish and maintain capabilities that are specifically chartered to combat terrorism. Examples include regionally focused counterterrorism investigation teams, shared intelligence capabilities, and centralized emergency response mechanisms. Terrorists operate across international boundaries. Consequently, the responses to defeat terrorists must also operate across international boundaries. A well-developed regional response is a key element of this strategy.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (consisting of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), for example, established an antiterrorism organization in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, following the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan.⁴¹ Although not a member, the United States may provide assistance to this and other regional organizations as they develop capabilities to fight terrorism. The global and international effort should be linked to regional efforts to establish a basis of cooperation and dialogue. The United States should strive to facilitate a mutually beneficial relationship between the global effort and regional and interregional efforts.

Assisting Partner States: To foster an international environment truly inhospitable to terrorism, sovereign states must stand firm against the threat of terrorism. This strategy endorses the approach outlined in the President Bush's State of the Union address that called upon states either to

join civilized societies in the fight against terrorism or to choose to stand with terrorists by providing active support or tacit approval for terrorism. Ultimately, each state is responsible for the activities that take place within its territory. The first lines of defense are the governments that have jurisdiction over terrorist havens, sanctuaries, financial networks, and communications systems. This strategy relies heavily upon the willingness of states to attack terrorists and those who support them vigorously wherever they are discovered.

Through bilateral agreements, the United States can provide a significant degree of assistance to states combating terrorism. Each situation is unique, as each state possesses its own set of abilities and capabilities. This, in turn, requires tailoring the type and timing of U.S. support. A number of international and regional resolutions, accords, and agreements enhance cooperation in the fight against terrorism. These mechanisms define state roles and responsibilities while highlighting that states should bear the burden of combating terrorism within their own territory.

Enabling Weak States: Many countries lack the stability, resources, or organization to confront terrorist organizations directly. Although these countries may be willing to combat terrorism, they may require outside assistance. The United States becomes a primary enabler by providing support ranging from training and assistance to assuming the lead effort in combating terrorists within a weak state.

Although the first choice of the United States is to let governments lead the fight against terrorism on their own territory, America should be poised to provide assistance. This includes not only intervening when states cannot effectively combat terrorism themselves but also supporting states through covert operations when fighting terrorists causes significant instability for the state's government. In a failing state, the United States may need to intervene whether invited or not. The bottom line is terrorists must not be afforded safe haven anywhere, particularly in weak states.

Motivating Reluctant States: In some instances, states may refuse to cooperate in combating terrorism. The United States and the international community should press for a united front against terrorism by encouraging all states to join in the fight, particularly those that have the wherewithal to contribute.

International and regional organizations, coalition partners, and surrounding states should be willing to provide incentives and disincentives to motivate all capable nations to support the war on terrorism. These should span all instruments of power, including economic aid and sanctions, application of information tools and measures, and military-to-military contacts. The United States and its partners, however, should fully understand why a state is reluctant to fight terrorism and attempt to address those concerns.

States may be reluctant to engage in the fight against terrorism because they prefer neutrality or isolation. Or they may condone terrorism against their adversaries. The international community should convince these states that it is in their best, long-term interests to defeat terrorism today, rather than risk the potential of a greater terrorist threat tomorrow.

Compelling Unwilling States: States that sponsor terrorism should be viewed no differently than organizations that engage in acts of terrorism. A wide range of instruments of power will be necessary to compel states to discontinue their support of terrorism. The United States should be willing to remove regimes that sponsor terrorism. To the maximum extent possible, America should garner international and regional support before embarking upon such an effort, employing military power as a last resort.

Every state should understand that it jeopardizes a great deal by supporting or sponsoring terrorism. The international community should work to communicate a clear deterrent message regarding state sponsorship of terrorism: Terrorism will not be tolerated regardless of the intended purpose.

State sponsorship is a critical source of strength for terrorist organizations. If terrorist organizations can be denied sanctuary and support, they will find it very difficult to marshal resources, develop plans, and conduct training. This is a key objective of the strategy and one that should be pursued with vigor, ultimately removing all state sponsorship of terrorism.

To a Grand Strategy: The United States should consistently press all states through bilateral, regional, and global means to make counterterrorism a top priority—not just today, but in the years and even decades to come. The United States and allies should remain forever vigilant against new terrorist threats. Overall, therefore, the objective should be to expand the coalition against terrorism by bringing in new members, deepening its foundations, and extending its reach through new, lasting frameworks for cooperation. In this way, the United States will help stymie formation of new terrorist groups. The diplomatic relationships, nation-state friendships, and international bonds developed and fostered in the war on terrorism provide society with a sound foundation of global cooperation in which to address and overcome other global evils such as genocide, or increasingly important global issues as HIV/AIDS, global warming, and environmental degradation. When new threats emerge on a global level, the international mechanisms of cooperation and determination to act decisively and rapidly will be in place.

Waging War on Terrorism

With the strategic aim of abolishment as an overarching guiding principle, the United States should work together with coalition partners to eliminate terrorism wherever it occurs. History has demonstrated that terrorists who operate within the boundaries of a single state often expand their influence into the surrounding region to receive financial support and ideological backing. Globalization has provided terrorist organizations the mechanisms to reach beyond their regions if they desire to do so. As a result, even the most remote terrorist organization can pose a direct threat to the United States. Therefore, the war on terrorism is as much a struggle against a methodology as it is against specific organizations. This means that while America may lead in the fight against global terrorism, the fight does not end there. Regional and state-level terrorists must also be uprooted, to the point that organized terrorism will no longer find a place in civilized society. This will likely take decades; ultimately, it may prove to be a destination at which society never arrives. Nevertheless, the aim is worth the journey and worthy of the best U.S. effort.

Although America is poised to counter a variety of threats on a global basis, the demands of the war on terrorism require unique capabilities, policies, and practices. The details of these requirements are provided in chapter 6 of this paper, but the following outlines several broad areas that require development or improvement:

- U.S. military forces should acquire capabilities that can exploit real-time intelligence with real-time force application.
- Intelligence gathering means and methods require bolstering.
- Intelligence organizations, military forces, law enforcement agencies, and related governmental offices require greater coordination and synchronization.
- Public diplomacy and information operations are needed to maximize legitimacy of the war on terrorism while undermining the terrorist organizations' appeal.
- Computer network attack and cyberdefense must be fully realized to exploit opportunities to disrupt terrorist activities while protecting friendly systems.
- Terrorism is a global problem that requires a global response. The acme of diplomacy is required to steel international resolve against terrorism.

- Agile partnerships with industry, international organizations, and private volunteer organizations will further broaden the support base and realize unique opportunities to combat terrorism.
- Homeland defense and combating terrorism strategies need to be integrated.
- Over the long term, international development efforts should be focused in ways that minimize the underlying causes of terrorism.

Collectively, the United States, coalition partners, international and private organizations, and industry, working together in a coherent and cohesive manner, can make great strides in defeating existing terrorist groups, denying them state sponsorship, and diminishing the underlying causes of terrorism. The war on terrorism will require considerable time, extensive resources, and tireless commitment. Waging a successful war on terrorism will require all these things, but none greater than a clear vision that terrorism must ultimately be abolished so that peaceful societies everywhere need not live in fear.

Operationalizing the Strategy against Terrorism

*We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.*⁴²

—George W. Bush
September 20, 2001

3–D Strategy of Abolishment

The United States, in a global leadership role, should seek to abolish terrorism by: *defeating* terrorist groups wherever they exist; *detering* future terrorist acts and their sponsors; and *diminishing* the underlying causes of terrorism while defending U.S. citizens at home and abroad.

The 3–D Strategy of Abolishment is designed to combat terrorism on three fronts, while simultaneously providing for the defense of Americans at home and abroad. The first is to *defeat* existing terrorist organizations by using all instruments of power directed at destroying their ability to survive and operate. The second is to develop the international instruments and mechanisms that will *deter* future acts of terrorism and preclude state and nonstate actors from providing support, sponsorship, and sanctuary to terrorist organizations. The third is to *diminish* the underlying causes of terrorism and to banish any expectation that terrorism will result in political, ideological, or material gain.

This strategy serves to protect U.S. national interests, shape the strategic landscape to promote international security, and maintain homeland security. It will require the direct, indirect, simultaneous, and sequential application of all national instruments of power against the entire spectrum of terrorism—whether global, regional, or state level.

Terrorist Organization Centers of Gravity

As discussed in chapter 2, terrorist organizations typically have five centers of gravity. Each of these centers of gravity must be targeted by the 3–D strategy in an effort to prevent terrorists from carrying out their aims. The following summarizes the capabilities that must be destroyed, neutralized, or mitigated to defeat terrorist organizations. If any one center of gravity is neutralized or eliminated, the entire terrorist organization will likely become paralyzed.

- leadership
- legitimacy of ideology
- financial support

- sanctuaries
- command and control network.

Each element of the strategy to combat terrorism is designed to disrupt or neutralize the terrorist organization's sources of strength. These elements work in concert and in parallel with each other to maximize the overall effect. The *defeat* element strikes at the heart of the terrorist organization's leadership, finances, and command and control network. The *deter* element works to communicate unacceptable consequences for engaging in or supporting acts of terrorism. The *diminish* element serves to delegitimize the terrorist organizations, legitimize coalition efforts, and win the hearts and minds of those the terrorists are trying to influence and recruit. At the same time these offensive efforts are conducted, the strategy should be integrated with the strategy to protect Americans at home and abroad.

Objective Oriented

The strategic construct of the 3-D strategy includes a series of clearly articulated objectives under each of the elements of the strategy. This allows the various tools of statecraft to be applied in a coherent manner and retain a significant degree of flexibility in its execution. As a national-level strategy, it is far more important to define what needs to be done rather than to delineate precisely how it should be done. Specifically, each element of the strategy contains:

- an overarching goal
- a series of supporting objectives
- further actions and resources required to describe each objective.


Each objective can be linked back to its applicable overarching goal (the 3Ds) and then to the strategic aim of abolishing terrorism as a methodology for societal change. While these strategic elements and objectives were written principally for the United States, others may find them useful as well. Coalition partners, industry, and international and private volunteer organizations all have a stake in this strategy and therefore may benefit from the views presented.

Integrating the Strategy

The war on terrorism will require the United States to work closely with coalition partners, international and private volunteer organizations, industry, and others to execute an effective and consistent strategy. While this war will be lengthy and victory ill defined, the strategy seeks to eliminate global and regional terrorism much sooner than defeating the many hundreds of terrorist organizations that operate within the confines of individual states. Although fewer terrorist organizations operate globally and regionally, they represent the greatest threat because they possess the resources to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The United States, therefore, should lead the effort against global terrorists, as well as play an active role in defeating regional terrorists. The nearer-term goal of this strategy is to eliminate these twin threats and then to concentrate on providing assistance to states as they combat terrorism within their borders. As figure 4 suggests, the United States will lead the fight against global terrorism, facilitate responses and actions to combat and negate regional terrorism, and provide assistance and support to states that are combating terrorism on their territory.

Each threat category, whether global, regional, or state-level, requires all elements of the 3-D strategy as well the requirement to defend America. The effort against global terrorism will be more focused on the *defeat* element while providing a strong defense and will likely require a greater emphasis on the use of force and unilateral action. The fight against regional terrorism requires a more balanced effort between all elements of the strategy, with an overall lower requirement for the United

Figure 4: Integrating the Strategy



States to employ force. For the state-level terrorist threat, the United States will most often serve as an enabler, providing key capabilities and assets to states as they combat terrorism within their borders. Over time, the strategy moves away from more force and unilateral action and toward less force and multilateral action. This will allow the United States to concentrate less on the *defeat* element of the strategy and more on the *diminish* and *deter* elements. Overall, the strategy seeks to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorism and, ultimately, the abolishment of terrorism. This will be achieved when terrorism is rare, sporadic, unorganized and, thus, can be prosecuted within a sovereign state as crime rather than an act of war.

Defeat Existing Terrorism

*There is no compromise possible with such people, no meeting of the minds, no point of understanding with such terror. Just a choice: defeat it or be defeated by it. And defeat it we must.*⁴³

—Tony Blair
October 2, 2001

Taking the Fight to the Terrorists

The first element of the 3–D Strategy of Abolishment focuses on defeating terrorist organizations at the global, regional, and state levels. Through direct and indirect use of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power, the United States and coalition partners will defeat terrorist organizations by attacking their centers of gravity.

Goal: Eliminate state sponsorship of terrorism and reduce organized terrorism to a level manageable as crime within the boundaries of a single state.

Objectives: Defeat existing terrorist groups by:

- identifying, isolating, and destroying terrorist leadership
- impugning their ideology and justification for terrorist acts
- disrupting their financial support and sponsorship
- denying them sanctuaries and safe havens
- compromising their command and control capabilities.

While it is unrealistic to expect that every single terrorist with malicious intent can be defeated, it is possible to destroy the synergy created by the interconnectivity of terrorist organizations and to reduce their scope and capability from global and regional levels to state level. Once their capability and scope are reduced to the confines of a single state, terrorist activities can be countered primarily through law enforcement mechanisms rather than international intelligence and military forces.

End State: The desired end state for this portion of the strategy is the defeat of existing terrorist organizations, with priority given to global terrorists, and the establishment of mechanisms that create an international environment hostile to terrorism. Ultimately, terrorism should be reduced to criminal events that are irrational and rare.

A Global Effort

The United States should lead the effort to defeat global terrorism because it is the only country capable of employing all instruments of national power on a significant level and global scale. However, this does not imply unilateral action. On the contrary, the United States should seek and form coalition partnerships to realize increased counterterrorism effectiveness and to help ensure continuous

focus on the worldwide counterterrorism fight. Continuous and relentless pursuit and defeat of terrorists at all levels is necessary to reduce terrorism to the substate level so that it can be combated as crime, not as a global war.

With its extensive technological, law enforcement, intelligence, and power projection capabilities, the United States will lead the overall effort against terrorist organizations that possess global reach. For those terrorist organizations posing a regional threat, the United States will facilitate coordination and provide support. At the state level, the United States will provide assistance for those states requesting additional capabilities to counter terrorist organizations within their boundaries.

Global terrorists pose a unique threat because they view the entire world as their battlefield. They draw upon resources from many nations and organizations and find sanctuaries and safe havens worldwide. With extensive support networks and financing, global terrorists are likely to obtain weapons of mass destruction. They might also use them, being free from the moral constraints that often restrict a nation-state's freedom of action. Global terrorists pose unique challenges as they expand their influence to numerous like-minded terrorist organizations. Their broad appeal to individuals, organizations, and states creates a virtual nation, spanning entire continents. The United States should be at the heart of the effort to defeat global terrorism. The United States has the means to employ all-source intelligence and project all instruments of power wherever required. Sharing resources is critical in terms of global, regional, and state efforts to defeat terrorist organizations and to achieve the abolishment of terrorism as a method for political change.

Managing the Conflict

The unprovoked attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon was a direct assault on the sovereignty of the United States. America has the right to use all means necessary, including force against the perpetrators, their support networks, and countries that provide safe haven. This right, even in a unilateral manner, is not only granted by international resolutions, such as UN Security Council Resolution 1373, but is also steeped in common cultural traditions.⁴⁴ Both international law and monotheistic traditions agree on the basic principles of just cause, the inherent right of self-defense, proportionality, limiting collateral damage and the nonharming of noncombatants, and conflict termination. These principles not only set the conditions for moral authority but also make operational sense.

Such a U.S. strategy can yield both high promise and tremendous peril. Any action taken against terrorist organizations and their sponsors must reconcile the cost of such actions against inherent risks. The United States needs to state its case clearly, without reservation, to maintain the authority to act. Constantly reinforcing the inherent right to eliminate terrorist groups will be a key feature of combating terrorism.

Principles: Defeating terrorism will require destruction of the identified terrorist groups and a long-term struggle for the hearts and minds of the world populations, particularly in the Middle East. Some nations and individuals may not directly support terrorist groups but provide tacit support by rationalizing terrorist activities or failing to act against terrorism when clear opportunities to do so arise. The strategic aim of this strategy, as laid out in chapter 3, encompasses the idea that terrorism is never a valid tool to effect change and that tacit support is just as immoral as direct support. While helplessness, poverty, and frustration are often cited as legitimate reasons for terrorist acts, abolishment of terrorism as a method for any change would invalidate those and all other rationalizations. The United States should not only lead the fight to destroy terrorist networks but also provide alternatives to those populations who would otherwise support terrorist groups.

When responding to the threat of terrorism, the United States and partners should understand that the terrorists do not attack simply to inflict damage on specific targets but to solicit a response that will further their cause. The true battle is over the hearts and minds of the people whom the terrorists are trying to influence. Misapplied or misdirected retaliation may reinforce terrorist claims regarding the United States and partners, further legitimizing their cause while delegitimizing U.S. and allied efforts. Therefore, short-term gains in the effort to defeat terrorist organizations must be carefully weighed against the longer-term battle for the hearts and minds of the larger population. Heavy-handed responses to acts of terrorism may yield immediate results against terrorist organizations, but they may also have the unintended consequences of exacerbating negative perceptions of the United States and partners over time.

Operational Preparation of the Battlefield: Operational preparation of the battlefield is the inverse of intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield seeks to determine where the enemy is, where he will be, what he is doing, and how he is doing it. Operational preparation of the battlefield involves allocating resources, posturing forces, and appropriating or initiating the instruments of power proactively to defeat terrorist groups, disrupt their activities, diminish their cause, and deny them support, sanctuary, or safe haven.

Preparing the battlefield operationally is, in military terms, posturing forces where they can best attack terrorist groups, prevent potential terrorist attack, conduct preemptive attacks, or respond rapidly following a terrorist incident. It involves understanding where the high-risk threats and areas potentially are and ensuring capabilities are postured to counter those threats. Operational preparation of the battlefield involves more than military force alone.

At the national security level, operational preparation of the battlefield entails the effective employment or posturing of all instruments of power necessary to combat terrorism. Anticipation, initiative, and proaction are the keys for the United States and allies to achieve success. Proactive engagement by the simultaneous use of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic resources to undermine terrorist groups and their support and sanctuary, while deterring their plans and attacking their assets, is critical. Diplomatic pressure—ranging from negotiations, incentives, and international condemnation to loss of diplomatic status—should be employed to end support for terrorism. Informational campaigns, focused at delegitimizing terrorist causes and leadership while enhancing coalition legitimacy, should be carefully executed to avoid a backlash. Economic engagement can play a supportive role. Actions—such as market incentives, refinancing or canceling debt, providing loans, imposing sanctions, preventing financial access to markets, freezing bank accounts and assets, offering rewards to compliant actors, and embargoing goods—may undermine the cause and support structure of terrorist organizations or reprimand sponsor states. Operational preparation of the battlefield will require the United States and its allies to seize the initiative and engage terrorism collectively with all the tools of statecraft in a proactive manner to set the conditions necessary to realize the desired results and end state.

Calculated Response: The United States and coalition partners should calculate the possible effects of any given action under consideration based upon a thorough understanding of the threat. As with nation-states, terrorist groups are far from monolithic and, hence, should be assessed within their individual context prior to initiating action. Necessary attributes to be considered include the nature of the group as well as its interests, goals, historical context, cultural identity, sources of support, causes for unity, and type of strategy.⁴⁵ Given the psychological roots of terrorism, responses should be weighed in terms of their potential to achieve maximum positive impact on the attitudes and beliefs of those who support terrorism. Failure to consider these factors may lead to ineffectual strategies that fall short of achieving desired objectives; strain or fracture coalition bonds; create

unintended consequences that hamper the overall effort of the coalition; and amplify the credibility and prestige of the terrorist group.

Targeted Response: Actions should be conducted within the framework of a feasible strategic vision to target preferentially and pursue terrorist groups that pose the greatest threat, while simultaneously maintaining pressure on lesser risks. To this end, prioritizing tasks and allocating assets should support identified objectives aimed at targeting and thus reducing the scope and capability of global threats and preventing the emergence of nascent threats. While broad international participation is ideal, the United States should be prepared to act alone if necessary. Targeted actions should be coordinated to exert relentless pressure on an identified terrorist group or sponsor state to achieve maximum synergistic effect while mitigating unintended consequences.⁴⁶

Measured Response: The United States and its allies should never lose sight of its battle for the hearts and minds of its global audience. Protracted military action will likely dampen support. The majority of actions undertaken to defeat terrorism should take place behind the scenes of everyday existence and should cause the least possible disruption to ordinary citizens. Pressure should be sustained, systematically and simultaneously across the spectrum of global, regional, and state-level terrorists, for the purpose of obtaining a specific objective or desired result but should never be indiscriminate, excessive, uncalculated, or reckless.

Escalation Management: Achieving the right balance in the use of military force is one of the more difficult challenges in combating terrorism. Establishing U.S. and coalition partner credibility and determination to use force against terrorist organizations, their support structure, their sanctuaries, and those who sponsor or provide haven to them can do extensive damage to terrorist ability to harm the innocent. The excessive or indiscriminate use of force, however, can also create an international perception that can damage legitimacy and undermine the long-term component of the overall strategy by alienating coalition members or partners or by generating support and sympathy for the terrorist cause. At the same time, use of violence by terrorists can build legitimacy for their cause. The more successful their attacks and the more they impact Western morale, the more credible they appear as rivals of the United States and the civilized world.⁴⁷ Therefore, these variables should be carefully considered in the war on terrorism to manage the escalation of violence.

Destruction of Centers of Gravity

There are five centers of gravity common to all terrorist organizations: leadership, ideology, financial support, sanctuaries, and command and control capabilities. Destruction, elimination, or disruption of any of the five will severely impede the ability of terrorist organizations to function.

Leadership: As mentioned in chapter 2, the role of leadership varies widely among terrorist organizations. Some groups are highly dependent upon a single charismatic leader while others are “hydra headed” in nature, with several individuals prepared to take control should the leader be captured or killed. Precise and timely intelligence is critical in properly defining who is in charge, the strength of his leadership abilities, the loyalty of his deputies, and most importantly, the net effect of his removal. Properly characterizing the leader or leaders of a specific terrorist organization will determine whether leadership is a true center of gravity, and, if so, how it can be influenced.

For most terrorist organizations, leadership is indeed a key center of gravity and therefore justifies significant resources to defeat it. There are a number of ways this center of gravity can be influenced, and, again, quality intelligence is essential in determining the most feasible approaches. Equally important is the effective application of the information instrument of power. By and large, the United States has proven ineffective on this front. Considerable effort is required to bolster capabilities to shape and communicate messages that support the war on terrorism, particularly in the

Middle East. The following provides several overarching concepts to influence or destroy this center of gravity:

- Discredit the leader by revealing true motives, providing unflattering information, and highlighting missteps and failures to reduce his appeal to group members and to the larger population.
- Drive wedges between the leaders of different factions within the terrorist group by exploiting differences in views or approaches, particularly between the most radical element and the more moderate ones.
- Create suspicion between the leader and his deputies through deception and disinformation in an effort to prey upon terrorists' exceptionally cautious and at times paranoid tendencies regarding secrecy and group loyalty.
- Enlist the assistance of recognized experts or highly regarded leaders who are sympathetic to the terrorists' *raison d'être* but are willing to denounce terrorist leaders and the strategy to employ terrorism as a means to effect change.
- Motivate and encourage nation-states, international organizations, and regional security groups to label terrorist group leaders as enemies to civilized society and traitors to the cause they are hoping to further.
- Offer substantial rewards for information leading to the arrest or capture of terrorist group leaders.
- Develop technologies and intelligence capabilities that aid in identifying and tracking specific individuals, along with systems that share information internationally, to improve prospects of capturing or neutralizing terrorist leaders.
- Match real-time intelligence capabilities with real-time weapons application to strike leaders wherever they might be detected.

Ideology: Virtually all terrorist groups are politically motivated and possess an underlying ideology or cause that provides some degree of legitimacy to their overarching aim. Whether based in secular or religious belief, the link between terrorist activities and their supporting ideology must be broken. This is perhaps the single most important center of gravity to influence in an attempt to limit the terrorist organization's appeal to the larger population. There is no clearer case than with the many terrorists who justify their activities through the Islamic faith. At stake are nearly 1.5 billion Muslims, many who live in the Middle East, with others located in just about every society across the globe. The United States and Western civilization should understand that the battle is not *with* the Muslims—it is *for* the Muslims. Every action undertaken, every speech presented, every partnership entered, and every sanction levied should bear that in mind. This requires the acme of public diplomacy and exceptional skill in information operations, of which the United States has been ill equipped and even inept at handling.

Fundamentally, there is a clash between the ideals of freedom and liberty on one hand, and the oppressive and tyrannical ideologies of those who have perverted the Muslim faith on the other. A radical and extremist view of Islam is at least as dangerous to democracy as communism, while a more moderate view of Islam is entirely congruent with democracy. This conflict is a battle of ideologies, and the larger Muslim population must be convinced that it is better to support democratic ideals than support Islamic militants, even though the militants represent an extreme view of their own faith. This will be a long-term campaign, one that must fight against the tide of strong anti-American and anti-Western sentiment in the region. Listed below are some points to consider when developing a campaign to undermine ideological support for terrorism:

- Establish a clear moral imperative among the nations of the world that terrorism will not be condoned, supported, or tolerated. A powerful information campaign is needed to denigrate the concept of terrorism and vilify those who engage in it.

- Provide a counter to the Muslim people on the propaganda perpetuated by terrorists and those who support them. Much like Voice of America used truth to illuminate issues during the Cold War, similar mechanisms are required in the Middle East. Great care is needed to ensure the message is communicated in a credible fashion, perhaps through agencies dissociated with the United States.
- Carefully coordinate public diplomacy efforts within the U.S. Government and with allies and partners. A consistent and integrated message on many fronts and from many countries will help articulate compassion for the Islamic people and disdain for those who engage in terrorism.
- Develop and strengthen analytical capabilities within the intelligence community to understand better how information and diplomacy can further the fight against terrorism, particularly as it applies to the Muslim mindset.
- Establish programs that allow religious leaders in the Middle East to visit Western societies in an effort to educate the compatibility of democracy with conservative religions.
- Engage in diplomatic measures to motivate states to rein in extremist education programs in mosques and *madrassas* that teach hatred toward the West and provide the intellectual underpinnings of terrorism.
- Encourage and provide the platform for Muslim clerics and leaders to denounce terrorism, and educate the Muslim people on the fallacy of using the Islamic faith to pursue extremist and militant goals.
- Initiate a wide range of programs that bring a clearer picture of Western society to the Middle East, such as educational exchange programs, distribution of appropriate publications and literature, satellite television programs, radio stations, and other such measures that communicate that Western culture is not a threat to the Muslim people.

Financial Support: Funding for terrorist organizations comes from a variety of sources and methods, both legal and illegal. Sources range from the most heinous of fundraising schemes such as drug trafficking and organized crime to redirected donations from well-intentioned individuals across the world. Considerable work has already been done in this arena, yet more can be done. The UN Security Resolution 1373 and 12 other UN terrorism conventions and protocols, along with 40 recommendations by the Financial Action Task Force, provide comprehensive measures to aid in disrupting financial support to terrorist organizations. On the domestic front, several U.S. initiatives are currently working to disrupt terrorist financing. The initial assessment is encouraging. For instance, the Department of Treasury's National Money Laundering Strategy now includes a Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center. The goals of the center are to map terrorist funding, shut down funding of these organizations, and curtail their ability to launder money through the international system.⁴⁸ There is a multiagency effort to freeze assets outside the United States. Moreover, United States is increasing the use of criminal and civil forfeiture. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act is also proving to be a worthwhile tool by threatening isolation from the American economy for state sponsors of terrorism. Some additional measures that should be considered include:

- Conduct deeper analysis into how terrorists move and conceal funds, with emphasis on integrating national and international intelligence data with programs designed to detect and track illicit funds transfers.
- Create purchasing profiles or funds management profiles that correlate to terrorist activities to illuminate terrorist groups or those who support them.
- Develop education programs to improve the financial community's awareness and understanding of terrorist financial methods and practices and to delineate appropriate responses when terrorist activities are uncovered.

- Remove ambiguity regarding the consequences of financially supporting or assisting terrorist organizations, and take measures to assure attribution. Provide incentives and disincentives to motivate financial institutions to support the effort against terrorism. To the maximum extent possible, reach international consensus on associated penalties for financially supporting terrorist organizations.
- Link International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and other such financial aid and support as conditional to providing cooperation in detecting and disrupting terrorist financing.
- Levy heavy economic and diplomatic pressure on any state that supports or finances terrorism. If necessary, threaten state sponsors with military action if other measures fail to achieve desired effects.
- Strengthen capabilities that can track financial activities of known terrorists or those captured to draw linkages to other organizations, financing apparatuses, terrorist cells, and sponsors or supporters.

Sanctuaries and Safe Havens: Denying sanctuaries and safe havens to terrorist organizations will significantly hamper their ability to survive and operate. Although small terrorist cells can move about and merge into various societies virtually undetected, being able to assemble larger numbers of members, marshal resources into a single location, and conduct training and planning operations in an unhampered manner are important considerations for most terrorist organizations. Possessing a sanctuary is almost essential for future growth and sustained operations, particularly if they intend to acquire or develop weapons of mass destruction.

Denying sanctuaries and safe havens is an essential aspect of the strategy to abolish terrorism. Ultimately, every state must denounce terrorism and work diligently to ensure terrorist organizations do not reside unhampered within their territory. Where necessary, the United States should provide aid and assistance to those countries too weak to combat terrorism on their own. Also, countries ambivalent or friendly to terrorist organizations must be motivated to join in the global effort against terrorism to ensure that terrorist organizations never find solace through sanctuaries or safe havens. The following recommendations may help eliminate sanctuaries and safe havens:

- Establish international mechanisms, including a series of incentives and disincentives, to end state sponsorship of terrorism.
- Publish lists that identify states and organizations that sponsor, support, or engage in acts of terrorism. Establish suitable penalties or responses for engaging in such activities.
- Improve intelligence capabilities to identify sanctuaries and share that information to assist states in defeating terrorism on their soil.
- Develop technologies and capabilities that improve border control mechanisms and share them with states around the world, focusing on information and data systems that help prevent undesirables from crossing borders.
- Create systems that monitor materials used by terrorists to include components associated with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Share those systems with states likely to encounter terrorists importing or exporting those components.
- Strengthen international protocols and accords that inhibit transfer of technologies, materials, or expertise on weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.
- Develop training and assistance programs to aid states and international organizations in their efforts to deny terrorist organizations sanctuaries and safe havens.
- Encourage private sector research and development of methods to detect, track, and confront terrorist organizations.

Command and Control: Modern communications technologies and the advent of the Internet have made this center of gravity extremely difficult to influence. Terrorist organizations rely on

digital communications systems such as cellular telephones, satellite communications, e-mail, and Web sites. The Internet in particular poses serious challenges because of the anonymous nature of the network. User identification names can be changed as often as necessary, and public locations such as Internet cafes and libraries provide capabilities with no return address.

While this center of gravity may be difficult to influence, it represents an essential capability for terrorist organizations to operate in a global fashion. Remote and isolated terrorist cells must be directed from a centralized but distant location. Global communications systems enable this dispersed network of operations. Nevertheless difficult to affect, the following actions should be undertaken to improve the ability to disrupt terrorist command and control systems:

- Characterize terrorist communications systems, networks, and techniques to determine vulnerabilities and opportunities for exploitation.
- Employ intelligence capabilities to acquire and penetrate terrorist organization communication systems to gather and exploit information.
- Develop systems that can monitor communications traffic in an effort to locate terrorists, terrorist cells, or facilities precisely.
- Destroy known command and control facilities and associated infrastructures.
- Exploit emerging computer network attack capabilities and other offensive information operations systems to disrupt terrorist computer communications and Internet-based capabilities.

Conflict Termination

Victory against terrorism will not be self-defining or self-evident. There will be no equivalent of a surrender ceremony on the deck of the U.S.S. Missouri.⁴⁹ The United States will have to judge when victory has been achieved against the goals and objectives established in this strategy. The full realization of victory will undoubtedly take many years, as the United States works toward a global consensus that terrorism is an unacceptable mechanism for societal change. Even then, the international community should maintain its vigilance to ensure terrorism never again achieves the degree of organization, freedom of action, and global reach as was the case on September 11, 2001.

Summary of Defeating Existing Terrorism

All forms of national power should be brought to bear in the fight against terrorism. Coalition partnerships and allies should assist this war with all means available. If countries are unable to help due to lack of resources, the United States should provide the means. If countries are unwilling to help, the United States should coerce or compel them to cooperate. When necessary, military force should be swift, resolute, and focused on destroying terrorist centers of gravity. Terrorism can be defeated only by identifying and isolating terrorist groups; disrupting their support networks and destroying infrastructure; impugning their ideology and rationalizations; and destroying terrorist leadership.

The war to defeat terrorism should be viewed as a war for the hearts and minds of the world's populations. Global diplomacy, education, economic support initiatives, and information campaigns should shape a new international norm in which terrorism is seen as immoral and repugnant. The defeat strategy should hunt terrorists, terrorist organizations, and regimes around the world, no matter where they hide. Terrorism is incompatible with civilization, and it must be rooted out and destroyed wherever it exists.

Deter Future Acts of Terrorism

*Our men and women in uniform are doing a brilliant job in the war on terrorism. We are grateful to them and proud. And the best way we can show our appreciation is to make sure that they have the resources, the capabilities and the innovative culture they need not only to win today's war, but to deter and, if necessary, defeat the aggressors we will surely face in the dangerous century ahead.*⁵⁰

—Donald Rumsfeld
January 31, 2002

Deterrence Framework

The second element of the 3-D Strategy of Abolishment focuses on deterring future acts of terrorism. To establish a credible deterrent, a set of capabilities and mechanisms should be developed and maintained that clearly communicates to potential terrorists, and those who support them, that the costs of engaging in terrorist acts far outweigh any perceived benefits. The deterrence message should be sent not only to terrorist organizations but also to the states that sponsor them, nonstate actors that front their activities, and individuals who might participate in terrorist activities. This goal is to convince individuals, organizations, and states to seek alternate methods of political change under threat of unacceptably costly penalties or reprisals.

Goal: To develop, acquire, and maintain the set of capabilities and mechanisms that deter individuals, organizations, and states from sponsoring or engaging in acts of terrorism.


Objectives: Deterrence should be developed to present a tailored message to individuals, organizations, and states. Objectives include:

- deterring terrorist organizations from conducting future attacks
- deterring state actors from sponsoring terrorism
- deterring nonstate actors from providing support
- deterring individuals from joining (and supporting) terrorist organizations.

End State: These objectives work cumulatively to reduce terrorism across the entire spectrum, from state-level terrorists to global terrorist organizations and their supporters. Possessing the necessary capabilities to combat terrorism effectively, communicating U.S. determination and resolve to fight terrorism wherever it occurs, and fostering an enemy perception that their aims are futile will help create an environment that ensures terrorism never results in ideological, political, or material gain.

Capabilities Required: A coherent deterrence message, based on the collective efforts of all nations opposed to terrorism, should be developed for each of the audiences listed above. The United

Figure 5: **Targeted Audiences**



States cannot establish credible deterrence alone. Fostering international norms and creating a world-wide environment hostile to terrorism requires concerted U.S. diplomatic efforts and international cooperation. A prerequisite of effective deterrence is that regardless of the region or state, the penalties for engaging in terrorism or providing support to terrorist organizations should be heavy and consistently applied. To ensure deterrence is effective and enduring, the United States and allies should develop or improve the following capabilities, policies, and practices:

- Establish a series of sanctions and incentives that collectively deters states from sponsoring terrorism and motivates states to support the effort against terrorism.
- Bolster intelligence gathering means, methods, and coordination. Human and signals intelligence are essential capabilities in detecting terrorist activities, assessing their vulnerabilities, and determining when and how to strike. As the fidelity of intelligence increases, so does the chance for success, while at the same time decreasing the risk of collateral damage or errant strikes.
- Acquire capabilities that can exploit real-time intelligence with real-time force application. Intelligence is often perishable; thus, the ability to strike swiftly in minutes rather than hours or days anywhere on the globe will be a key capability in ultimately destroying terrorist organizations. This will require a degree of reorganization, training, and education—in addition to acquisition of new capabilities.
- Enhance coordination and synchronization among intelligence organizations, military forces, law enforcement agencies, and other governmental organizations to identify, track, and prevent terrorist activities. This information must be shared in appropriate ways and channels with coalition partners as well.
- Expand public diplomacy efforts and information operations, weaving them into the overall strategy to heighten the legitimacy of the war on terrorism and undermine the appeal of terrorist organizations simultaneously.

- Improve capabilities to support computer network attack and cyberdefense to exploit opportunities to disrupt terrorist activities while protecting government, industry, and private computer systems from terrorist exploitation.
- Establish partnerships with industry, international organizations, and private volunteer organizations to broaden further the support base and to realize unique opportunities to combat terrorism. Private sector ingenuity and creativity may provide critical technologies and innovative ways to defeat terrorist organizations. These capabilities should be developed and exported to coalition partners as they emerge. In addition to industry, many international organizations and private volunteer organizations have experienced the threat of terrorism, and their extensive experiences may be extremely useful. Because the war on terrorism will often be conducted in areas of great humanitarian need, integrating operations with these organizations will be essential.
- Integrate efforts against the spreading of weapons of mass destruction and combating terrorism. These issues are closely linked and require strategies and policies to be coordinated to ensure these weapons do not fall into the hands of terrorist organizations.
- Strengthen homeland defense as a means to deter potential terrorists from planning attacks against the United States. Potential terrorists must be convinced that their efforts will likely result in failure and that they will endure the shame of life in prison rather than the perceived rewards for dying for their cause.

U.S. Intentions and Enemy Perceptions: Collectively, the United States, coalition partners, international and private organizations, and industry, working together in a cohesive manner, can deter existing terrorist groups, their sponsors and supporters, as well as individuals contemplating life as a terrorist. Possessing these capabilities will not be sufficient to deter potential terrorist activities if they remain secret or unpublished. A failure to communicate U.S. intentions and capabilities could lead terrorists to believe they may be able to achieve their goals. This communication should firmly establish the perception in the minds of those engaging in terrorism that their efforts will be futile, perhaps leading them to pursue alternative means to gain their political objectives.

The ultimate purpose of deterrence is to manage the perceptions of terrorists and their supporters. Leaders of terrorist organizations must believe that state sponsorship will eventually cease, thereby eliminating safe havens, that fewer and fewer nonstate actors will risk providing support and, most importantly, that achievement of political objectives is futile. Over time, the number of individuals undertaking terrorist tactics and attempting missions will fade. This objective directly attacks the terrorist mindset, distinguishing it from other elements of the 3-D strategy.

Historically, deterrence has been viewed within the context of U.S.-Soviet relations. That form of deterrence focused on the relationship between two stable state actors. The means to communicate American intentions spanned the gamut of available vehicles but was focused on one primary audience. The deterrence process for geographically dispersed terrorist organizations, well connected via modern communications, is more complex, but follows a similar intent. Most importantly, the message must reach its target audience—the group leaders, group members, and pools of potential recruits, and to the sponsors, whether they are state or nonstate actors.

The biggest difference from the U.S.-Soviet relationship is that deterrence may in some instances fail. There will always be an individual, group, or organization desperate or unbalanced enough to engage in terrorist acts, regardless of the perceived costs or signaled U.S. intent. Deterrence activity simply may have no consequence for them. Yet even if occasionally unsuccessful, U.S. and coalition response can instill a mindset within the larger regional and international audience by communicating that terrorist activities will not succeed. The most desperate individuals can thus be marginalized. Deterrence also can work by reducing the adversary's payoff, if he is pursuing an agenda beyond terror itself.

For the deterrence message to be effective, particularly against the most desperate, each of the three aspects of deterrence should be maximized.

$$\text{Deterrence}_{\text{Them}} = (\text{Capabilities}_{\text{Us}}) \times (\text{Intentions}_{\text{Us}}) \times (\text{Perception}_{\text{Them}})$$

- Capabilities: The cumulative instruments of power wielded by the United States and partners to combat terrorism.
- Intentions: The resolve possessed by the international community to defeat terrorist organizations and willing participants.
- Perception: The belief on the part of terrorists, potential terrorists, and sponsors that the United States and partners possess effective capabilities and the resolve to use them.

As this formula suggests, each aspect of the deterrence equation should be maximized to strengthen the overall message. If any aspect is zero, then the overall product is zero and deterrence fails. For each of the objectives discussed below, capabilities, intentions, and perceptions each play a critical role in communicating an effective deterrent and therefore require careful modulation. Although some audiences are more deterrable than others, the overall message is strengthened by a comprehensive approach. For example, the lone terrorist who is committed to sacrifice his life is very difficult to deter. If, however, he is more likely to get captured and imprisoned rather than die for his cause, he may rethink his mission. Some individuals appear to volunteer for suicide missions to garner financial support for their families. Convincing these individuals that their mission will result in failure, or that their family's financial assistance might be intercepted, has deterrent value. Other individuals who are considering joining a terrorist organization may reconsider if the organization continually fails to achieve its stated goals. These and other considerations are discussed in greater depth under each of the applicable objectives.

Deterring Terrorist Organizations from Conducting Future Attacks

Terrorist organizations are the most challenging of the four target-audiences to deter. Three principal reasons underlie this conclusion. First, terrorist organizations are able to exploit the technologies brought about by globalization, such as the anonymous nature of the Internet, to plan and conduct operations virtually undetected. Accountability and attribution are daunting tasks. If terrorists know they will go undetected, then they will proceed undeterred. Second, many terrorists are willing to sacrifice their lives for their goal. Establishing penalties that exceed perceived benefits for those who wish to die for their cause poses a significant deterrent challenge. Third, leaders of terrorist organizations believe acts of terrorism will further their cause. They see utility in engaging in acts of terrorism to draw attention to their cause and to coerce governments or other decisionmakers to yield to their demands. Although challenging, deterring terrorist organizations from conducting future attacks is possible.

Intelligence is key. To deter terrorist organizations, they must believe they will be held accountable for their activities and, more importantly, that they are likely to be captured before they can carry out their aims. Globalization has made this task more difficult. The greater ease of moving people, resources, and information across borders has allowed terrorists to travel widely and build globe-spanning infrastructures. In addition to the obvious example of the Al Qaeda network, Lebanon's Hizballah operates on six continents. This infrastructure extends the geographic options for attacks, provides opportunities for recruitment and fundraising, and facilitates movement of matériel and other support functions. More generally, terrorist cells frequently cross international boundaries and often contain members of more than one nationality. Many terrorists have affiliations

to more than one group, which allows greater cooperation in obtaining counterfeit documents and moving personnel. These loosely affiliated, transnational terrorist networks are difficult to predict, track, and penetrate. Experts note that advances in communications and information technology facilitate terrorist operations. Terrorist leaders often use satellite telephones, allowing them to remain inaccessible while influencing events far away. Terrorists also use the Internet for long-distance operational direction and communication, with some groups using it for propaganda, recruitment, and fundraising.

Given the advantages that globalization and technology have provided to terrorist organizations, increased funding and administrative reforms are essential to bolster counterterrorism efforts by the National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other intelligence agencies. The NSA effort to intercept communications has provided the majority of operational counterterrorism intelligence, but it is losing its capability to target and exploit the modern communications systems used by terrorists, seriously weakening its ability to warn of possible attacks and track terrorist activities. Lieutenant General Michael Hayden (USAF), NSA director, is taking steps to upgrade and modernize NSA capabilities, but additional funding and a greater sense of urgency are required.⁵¹ To address near-term needs, various collection assets should be redirected to devote more attention to terrorist targets, while maintaining sufficient capabilities to warn of threatening developments elsewhere.

According to the National Commission on Terrorism, the CIA Counter Terrorist Center (CTC) suffered from inadequate resources and had to cut back or eliminate plans to increase operational efforts prior to September 11, 2001. It should continue to receive sufficient funding to increase its efforts to coordinate the national intelligence process involving analysis, collection, and covert action for the war on terrorism. The commission also noted that CIA guidelines, adopted in 1995, restricting recruitment of sources who may have been involved in criminal acts, should be changed to exempt the recruitment of counterterrorism sources.

To make U.S. efforts effective enough to deter terrorist attacks, interagency cooperation should take on a new priority and sharing information among agencies should become more robust. Such cooperation will require persistent efforts to break down barriers and stovepipes and will be a major task of the new Office of Homeland Security. Again, according to the National Commission on Terrorism:

The Law Enforcement community is neither fully exploiting the growing amount of information it collects during the course of terrorism investigations nor distributing that information effectively to analysts and policymakers. Although the FBI does promptly share information warning about specific terrorist threats with the CIA and other agencies, it is far less likely to disseminate terrorist information that may not relate to an immediate threat even though this could be of immense long-term or cumulative value to the Intelligence Community.

As long as a lack of coordination, whether interagency or international, leaves gaps in counterterrorism efforts, terrorist organizations will be undeterred, believing they can exploit these gaps to successfully attack.⁵²

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Robert Mueller undertook a major initiative in May 2002 to restructure FBI counterterrorism activities, including the expansion of its intelligence analysis capabilities.

The assistance of foreign governments is also critical to preventing terrorist attacks in the United States and elsewhere. There should be greater integration between U.S. military capabilities and foreign law enforcement agencies. It may often be more appropriate for friendly nations to lead the fight against a terrorist organization with the United States providing assistance. Foreign

governments in many cases have the capabilities and sources essential to disrupt terrorist networks that are superior to U.S. capabilities.

While information sharing and mutual support are essential, terrorism is best fought as crime within a single state, with well-trained and equipped local law enforcement officials, not the United States, leading the way. Just as the United States goes about building an international coalition to support military action and exert diplomatic pressure, it should use various levers of power and influence to press foreign intelligence agencies and law enforcement organizations to share more information and to assume primary responsibility for targeting and destroying terrorist networks within their jurisdictions.

Bolstering U.S. intelligence means and methods, as well as tapping into those of friends and allies, will significantly enhance the ability to detect terrorist plans early, disrupt their operations, and hold them fully accountable. Repeated successes in this regard will eventually generate a deterrent effect. Credibility and consistency are key.

Detering Terrorist Group Members: An obvious question regarding deterring terrorists is how to provide penalties or consequences that are worse than dying for their cause. Because some terrorists are willing to make the ultimate sacrifice, the popular assumption is that these individuals are undeterrable. But this assumption is not necessarily so. First of all, there is not an unlimited supply of individuals wishing to die in order to carry out a terrorist act. Most terrorist acts allow the terrorist to escape, or at least provide the possibility for escape. Possessing the capability to bring these individuals to justice establishes a long understood criminal deterrent.

For those who plan to die, a deterrent message needs to communicate at least four things. First, the chances of success are highly remote. Second, if captured, the terrorist's fate must be worse than a martyr's death. Third, there must be a question in the mind of the terrorist that the act of terrorism will further the terrorist organization's goals. And fourth, the whole concept of suicide attacks as a form of martyrdom must be delegitimized by Islamic religious leaders.

To ensure the chances of success are remote, capabilities previously discussed should be acquired and demonstrated to embed significant doubt in the mind of the terrorist that he can execute his plans undetected and unencumbered. Effective defenses are essential to bolster this message. Homeland security is a key element of the overall deterrence effort. If a terrorist is convinced that he is unlikely to conduct operations successfully in the United States, he may look elsewhere. This requires an all-out information operations campaign to communicate both robust defenses and successes in thwarting terrorist aims. Terrorists who see repeated failures and captures of fellow terrorists might rethink their operations.

A terrorist may be willing to die for his cause but be unwilling to spend the rest of his life in the unglamorous, isolated, largely forgotten role of a prisoner. Those convicted of terrorism should endure exceptional hardship when brought to justice. There should be no effort to rehabilitate these criminals. If a death sentence is not administered through the judicial process, then incarceration for life—consistent with American values of humane treatment for prisoners—should be the primary alternative. Establishing international norms for terrorist sentencing may provide added impetus, placing all terrorists on notice that the penalty will be severe regardless of the location they choose to conduct terrorism. The individual terrorists must be likened to the most heinous criminal, similar to the stigma a child molester carries today. Similarly, terrorism must be regarded as an exceptionally evil undertaking such as genocide or slavery. Again, information operations and public diplomacy will be critical in establishing an international attitude that terrorism is taboo. Also, religious leaders need to be enlisted to communicate this message clearly.

In addition to establishing a high probability of intercepting terrorist operations and establishing tough penalties if captured, there should be doubt placed in the terrorist's mind that even if acts of terrorism are successfully carried out, the overall aims may not be achieved. Over the past 20 years, the policy of not negotiating with terrorists has contributed to significant reduction in airline hijackings. Potential hijackers have been deterred because security measures have been enhanced, but, more importantly, no positive gain was achieved by engaging in hijacking. Governments refused to give in to demands. With time, strengthened international resolve to stand firm against terrorists and maintaining a policy of nonnegotiation may convince terrorists that there is no utility in engaging in acts of terrorism. Such a perception will likely take years to develop, but there may be a shorter-term positive effect if individual terrorists can be convinced that dying for their cause will not result in any political, ideological, or material gain.

Detering Terrorist Leadership: Organizational survival is a primary responsibility of leadership. For deterrence to succeed, the leadership of terrorist organizations must be convinced that continuing acts of terrorism will result in the demise of their organization. To that end, the United States should signal to terrorist leaders (through deeds and words) that America has the improving intelligence means and methods and the capabilities to take the fight to the terrorist organizations. These signals to terrorist leaders must be credible and the capabilities demonstrated in large part to show U.S. resolve to use them consistently over time.

To attack terrorist organizations wherever they exist, the U.S. military needs to enhance its ability to combat asymmetric threats. As noted in the Secretary of Defense's September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, defense planning needs to shift from a "threat-based" model to a "capabilities-based" model (that is, determining military needs by focusing on how an adversary might fight instead of who that adversary might be). This change in focus will be critical to military operations to deny terrorists the possibility of successfully completing their acts of terror.

As intelligence capabilities continue to provide fused information faster, better, and more accurately, systems should be developed that take advantage of real-time intelligence. Intelligence is often perishable, and action should be taken in minutes rather than hours or days. For terrorist organizations to be deterred by convincing their leaders that their capabilities will be destroyed, the United States should procure weapon systems postured to take immediate advantage of critical intelligence data and emerging opportunities to strike. This may require a combination of greater overseas basing, weapon systems forward deployed with long loiter times, weapons that can travel long distances swiftly with great accuracy, and cooperation with friends and allies. The end result should be to establish key military capabilities, frameworks of interagency and international cooperation, as well as clear examples of success to convince terrorist leaders to seek other means of achieving their aims.

Detering State Actors from Sponsoring Terrorism

It is critical to convince all international actors that the international community of nations will hold states accountable for supporting or abetting terrorism in any manner. There must be no tolerance for those states that sponsor terrorist organizations, provide sanctuary, or assist them in any way. States must be deterred from establishing a relationship of any kind with terrorist organizations. This can be achieved principally through three methods. The first method is through diplomatic measures to convince states to support the campaign against terrorism and cease cooperation with terrorist organizations. The second method is to establish a series of "carrots and sticks" to reward those nations willing to fight terrorism and punish those states who insist upon supporting terrorism. The third method is to demonstrate the resolve to replace a regime that continues to sponsor terrorism when all other efforts have failed.

Diplomacy First: The United States should use diplomacy to convince friendly governments to support openly activities such as law enforcement and military and intelligence cooperation, to create a public perception that a strong, pervasive coalition of governments is implementing measures to thwart terrorism wherever it exists. The United States should convince unfriendly governments to declare openly that they will not host terrorists or provide other forms of support to create a public perception that terrorists are unwelcome even in ideologically sympathetic states. In addition, all governments should be convinced to declare openly their opposition to terrorism in all forms, reducing their public acceptance and attractiveness as means of promoting political change.

Traditional diplomacy includes multilateral bodies such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the ASEAN Regional Forum, to name just a few. These organizations will be important arenas both for forging effective cooperation and for publicizing such cooperation to the world.

While the Department of State and U.S. Embassies will have primary responsibility for conducting traditional diplomacy in support of the counterterrorism campaign, other agencies with representation abroad, in particular DOD through the regional commanders in chief, will need to engage in government-to-government discussions in certain circumstances. At the highest level, the President will need to undertake direct contact with foreign heads of state. Congress has a part to play through official visits and through international cooperation between legislatures (such as the North Atlantic Assembly).

A key point in effecting deterrence through diplomacy is that measures taken by governments need to be declared openly. While clandestine cooperation may serve the goal of defeating terrorism, public cooperation is needed to create the perception that governments are working together to thwart terrorism. Encouraging governments to declare their efforts against terrorism publicly can be done through regular diplomatic contacts with U.S. Embassies and other diplomatic missions, including missions to multilateral organizations (for example, the U.S. mission to NATO). These contacts should include senior level discussions and visits by U.S. officials, up to and including the President, diplomatic contacts by the regional commanders in chief and other senior military officials, Congressional visits and other international legislative activities, and use of international conferences and other gatherings. Publicly displaying a series of tough diplomatic measures will make states think twice about supporting terrorism or turning their back on the fight against terrorist organizations. Still, some states may be unconvinced and will require the risk of greater penalties to forego supporting terrorism.

Carrots and Sticks: Establishing a tailored set of incentives and sanctions will widen the gap between cooperative and uncooperative states. States should see tangible benefits of participating in the effort and clear consequences if they support terrorism. Deterrence is thus twofold: States who participate in terrorism risk losing certain international privileges, trade relationships and prestige, and thus fall under the scorn of the international community in a variety of ways.

To strengthen the commitment to combat terrorism and to support the international effort, some states, particularly developing nations, should be offered a series of incentives. Additional aid programs, foreign investment, and favored trade status should be linked to the terrorism effort. These weak states may require direct assistance in fighting terrorist organizations, which the international community should provide. Although weak states may have much to lose regarding a decision to support terrorism, developed states have even more to lose. Status in regional and international security organizations could be jeopardized, as well as standing in the international financial community.

Sanctions are known to be a blunt policy instrument, but they have been successful in modifying state behavior, particularly if the leadership is closely linked to the general population. Often,

however, sanctions impact more heavily on disadvantaged members of society than they do on decisionmakers. The risk of differential impact is likely higher in the type of authoritarian state that is most apt to support terrorism. In light of this, imposition of economic sanctions is a concrete demonstration of international and U.S. resolve to confront terrorism with all available weapons. It is a clear statement of intent—a key factor in the deterrent equation. In addition to the many economic sanctions available, the international community should pursue a “name and shame” policy, clearly highlighting those nations that are contributing to terrorism. Widely publicized lists with clear criteria for being named and for being removed from the list would have a deterrent effect.

Replacing Regimes: If diplomacy and economic sanctions fail to convince a state to stop supporting terrorist organizations, states should understand that they risk the same fate as the Taliban. To create a credible deterrent, the United States should work with the international community to lay out clear criteria when regime change is justified. Obviously, civilized society cannot tolerate terrorist organizations obtaining weapons of mass destruction. A state that is willing to arm terrorist organizations with such a capability should be a certain target for regime change. Peaceful nations around the world cannot wait until a nuclear warhead is detonated in London or a smallpox outbreak in Tokyo or a nerve agent is introduced into the Washington, DC, subway system. An initiative for deterrence through assured regime change should be started now before weapons of mass destruction fall into the hands of terrorist organizations.

It will be more difficult to reach consensus on less threatening cases of state support of terrorism. Although it would be extremely difficult to achieve, the international community should establish an accord on the conditions that will result in virtually automatic approval to replace a state regime. States must see a united front and be convinced that the international community will not tolerate their acting as a haven. Although it may be more appropriate to retain a degree of ambiguity concerning the U.S. and partners’ response, particularly the use of nuclear weapons, deterrence generally works best when the consequences are clearly identified and credible capabilities exist to bring them about. To establish a credible deterrent, the United States and international community should develop consensus on when and how to act and should possess a credible capability to do so.

The United States and partners should possess a credible capability to replace a state regime if deemed necessary. Reprisal must be swift and effective; there will likely be no time to develop and field forces if a state is committed to supporting terrorist organizations. If weapons of mass destruction are being supplied to terrorist organizations, then that supply must be stopped immediately. Therefore, those capabilities must exist today and potential adversaries must know it.

Detering Nonstate Actors from Providing Support

A key center of gravity discussed in chapter 2 is the financial support of terrorist organizations. Although some terrorist organizations are supported by states, nonstate actors such as companies, corporations, charities, and other nonstate organizations finance the majority of them through licit and illicit means. This financial support provides the means for terrorists to operate in a global manner and enables an air of legitimacy when moving funds around, obtaining training and education, renting facilities, buying equipment, and conducting other routine business activities that allow them to blend into society. These nonstate actors must be deterred from providing aid and assistance to terrorist organizations. This can be achieved by establishing an environment that provides greater financial transparency on an international basis, establishing greater global awareness of organizations involved in terrorist support, and lowering barriers to enforcing asset seizures and freezing funds.

Financial Transparency: Several international systems for monitoring and control of international financial activities are already in place. These include interbank systems operated through the

Bank for International Settlements and the anti-money-laundering efforts of the Financial Action Task Force of the OECD. These international efforts are based on national-level surveillance. A coordinated effort to strengthen and integrate national-level surveillance systems will be required to build an international system sufficient to deter financial support to terrorists.

International financial cooperation currently does not extend far beyond the banking sector. New sectors will have to be incorporated to cover all aspects of the global financial system that could be exploited by terrorists. For example, in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attack, there was speculation that terrorist organizations had sold short stocks in airlines and other companies directly impacted by the attack as a means of raising funds. While this rumor has since been discounted, it could potentially happen in the future. Putting systems in place to monitor suspicious investment transactions could act as a deterrent against terrorist profit making on future attacks.

Private sector cooperation can also make an important contribution to deterring terrorists from using the international financial system. The opportunity for illicit profits that such transactions create will make it impossible to prevent terrorist use of the system completely. However, legitimate businesses might see it as being in their own self-interest to discourage terrorism and can be counted upon to help if asked. Approaches should be made to major international business institutions such as the International Chamber of Commerce, as well as to major multinational corporations like Citibank. As mentioned earlier, deterrence measures taken by both public and private sector entities need to be declared openly and discussed in an open forum. Also, successes in combating the financial network of terrorist organization should be widely publicized to create the perception that the financial sector is effective in thwarting terrorism.

Identifying Terrorist Support Organizations: To heighten nonstate actor perception that they will likely be caught supporting terrorist organizations, the United States and partners should take full advantage of international banking institutions. Money is the lifeblood of global terrorism and international financial networks are the veins through which that blood flows. The existence of extensive informal networks with international scope (such as the Arabic system of *hawala*) will make it impossible to close off the flow of terrorist funds entirely. However, closer monitoring of the international financial system for possible terrorist-related transactions could have a deterrent effect if it increases the perception that fund movements will increase the danger of exposure for hidden terrorist activities.

It is not clear that the informal transfer systems are able to move massive volumes of cash (that is, multimillion dollar transactions). As a result, organizations that front terrorist groups might be forced to break up larger transfers into numerous smaller packages, increasing the risk of exposure. Monitoring the main financial networks could lead to identification of funds supporting terrorist activities as they reenter the standard banking system. Either way, the risk that nonstate actors could be identified through their financial transactions will be a deterrent to moving more money than is absolutely essential, thus reducing their operational capability and reach of the terrorists.

Increasing Consequences of Providing Support: Ongoing efforts to target the finances of terrorists and freeze assets should be expanded and publicized. Although groups that support terrorists have had assets frozen, they often find other ways to transfer funds. They use new accounts in different banks, alter financial flows, or close their business altogether and rapidly establish an alternate operating location. Since many countries lack the institutions and laws the United States has for freezing or seizing illicit assets, greater emphasis should be placed on encouraging nations to adopt more stringent rules on asset seizure and easing of banking secrecy regulations, and then publicizing those new rules. Establishing an international set of rules and regulations when dealing with organizations supporting terrorism will enhance deterrence by bringing the discussion in the public domain

and making all companies aware of the extensive resources the international financial community has to root out and stop financial transfers to terrorists.

Those companies or corporations responsible for supporting terrorism must be held criminally liable and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. Establishing international norms for sentencing and standardized penalties would prove useful in conveying a united front against terrorism worldwide. Governments and agencies could be provided incentives to seek out terrorism funding aggressively by allowing them to retain assets frozen from illicit accounts. Offering substantial rewards that lead to the arrest and conviction of terrorist supporters would provide additional deterrence. The cumulative effect of increased chances for detection, greater consequences if apprehended, and large groups of people essentially being bribed to reveal supporters would send a powerful deterrence message.

Deterring Individuals from Joining Terrorist Organizations

Terrorist organizations require a constant influx of recruits to expand their operations and replace losses due to arrests, casualties, and defections. Deterring individuals from joining the ranks of terrorists will significantly hinder terrorist organizations from achieving their long-term goals. This can be done by educating potential recruits about the sinister nature of terrorism beginning at a very early age and engaging in a public diplomacy effort to demonstrate that terrorists will eventually be captured and brought to justice.

Educating Potential Recruits: Perhaps the single best method to deter potential recruits from joining terrorist organizations is through education. From a relatively early age, the world's youth need to be taught about the sinister nature of terrorism. Killing innocent people to achieve political, ideological, or material gain must be denigrated at every turn. The focus of this effort must be to delegitimize terrorism as an acceptable methodology. It must ultimately become taboo. Terrorism must be identified for what it is and never described in manner that suggests one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. The educational process should include what life is like as a terrorist in a thoroughly unglamorized way. The overall effort is to define terrorism as something to be shunned, to understand the pain and anguish terrorism causes, and to realize that nothing is achieved in the end.

Public Diplomacy Effort: Potential recruits motivated by religious beliefs, such as those drawn to Al Qaeda because of Osama bin Laden, see themselves as the true believers, who eagerly seek the influence of a charismatic cult-like leader. Their behavior does not reflect individual psychopathology—they are not mentally ill—but rather reflects the dynamics common to group members who become followers of a persuasive leader. Actually, terrorist recruits are often screened to rule out the psychologically disturbed, for they pose unacceptable security risks. In contrast to the secular terrorists of the late 1960s through 1980s, whose target audience was comprised of their constituents and of Western opinion, the emerging religious terrorists of the last decade look to God as their judge. Extolling suicide bombings as the highest callings of martyrdom for the Islamic faith, clerics, religious leaders, and fanatics such as Osama bin Laden motivate followers by summoning divine legitimacy to sustain their resolve.

Given the overriding justification provided by such a divine calling, psychological deterrence becomes challenging indeed. Consider the psychological profile of the September 11, 2001, suicide hijackers. Educated, well dressed, and articulate, these young men exhibited a level of discipline, commitment, and courage that served as a formidable vehicle through which they executed their rage in the name of Allah. Accustomed to living discreetly in the United States, they willingly subordinated their individual needs to the service of the group vision as espoused by Osama bin Laden.

Religious education taught them to accept authority without questioning. Isolated from opportunity and disenchanted with the anomie of life within their own societies, these suicide terrorists finally found meaning in the confines of the mosque. Military training and ideological indoctrination reinforced their belief system and further instilled discipline and the means to conduct terrorist operations. In short, they belonged at last to a group that provided meaning to their existence.

The power and persistence of this group cohesion must not be underestimated. Observers of the alleged terrorists incarcerated following the 1998 Embassy bombings noted that these suspects did not soften their views when isolated from the group. Rather, separation resulted in increased cohesion and commitment to the cause, as evidenced by their efforts to continue planning future operations, such as September 11, 2001. Years of thorough preparation guided their actions in accordance with the Al Qaeda handbook, which features the following dedication: "Islamic governments have never and will never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they have always been—by pen and gun; by word and bullet; by tongue and teeth."⁵³ The sophisticated nature of this rhetoric clearly indicates an educated audience as its intended target. Invoking the Koran in support of their actions, these suicide terrorists thus perceive themselves to be soldiers for Allah, enlisted to help struggling Muslims prevail in conflicts spanning the globe.

To prevail against this type of foe, the United States should likewise engage in psychological warfare pitted at influencing the hearts and minds of nations and communities around the world. The strategy of psychological deterrence should focus on undermining the group dynamics of suicidal terrorists by delegitimizing their leadership, decreasing external group support, and inhibiting potential recruits from joining. Muslim religious and civic leaders should lead public diplomacy and education campaigns that correct the distorted interpretation of the Koran and convey a more positive image of the Western world. Furthermore, the civilized world should work together to provide disenfranchised youth nonviolent ways to participate within their societies and to achieve economic, social, and political justice. Engagement and negotiation should be shunned, as such practices would confer status far beyond that deserved by terrorist leaders, whose personal gratification needs would likely sabotage any political agreement, however legitimate it may seem when offered. Terrorism can be neither contained with security measures nor defeated using military force alone. With concerted resolve over a period of years, however, terrorism can be deterred and reduced to a local instead of global threat. Simply put, potential terrorists must have an alternative to turn to. For example, recruitment of suicide bombers plummeted when it looked as though political activism might yield a free Palestinian state. Psychological deterrence can work. Restoring hope to disenchanted populations is its objective.

Summary of Deterring Future Terrorism

Although some believe that terrorists are undeterrable, a strong argument can be made otherwise. State and nonstate actors can be deterred from providing assistance if confronted with the proper mix of incentives and punishments. U.S. policies should ensure that state sponsors of terrorism will feel the wrath of the civilized world, promising that these states either will see their leadership changed or, through sanctions, will be left behind as the world progresses. As for nonstate actors, they must believe there is a high probability that they will be rooted out and eliminated if they support terrorism.

The tougher challenge applies to the actual terrorist organizations and their followers. As discussed above, terrorists must believe that costs outweigh the perceived benefits and, ultimately, that engaging in terrorism is useless. Individuals considering joining a terrorist organization must be presented with the likely outcome of a lengthy prison term or a death sentence.

In sum, U.S. efforts should create an environment that serves to deter terrorism. To do so, the United States should acquire and maintain the capabilities that underpin deterrence. States that sponsor terrorism, terrorist organizations, and individual terrorists must clearly understand the U.S. resolve to use those capabilities to defend itself and to retaliate against states, organizations, or individuals who continue to support or attempt acts of terror.

Diminish the Underlying Causes of Terrorism

... we must look beyond the immediate danger of terrorist attacks to the conditions that allow terrorism to take root around the world. These conditions are no less threatening to U.S. national security than terrorism itself. The problems that terrorists exploit—poverty, alienation, and ethnic tensions—will grow more acute over the next decade. This will especially be the case in those parts of the world that have served as the most fertile recruiting grounds for Islamic extremist groups.⁵⁴

—George Tenet
February 6, 2002

A Long-Term Effort

Diminishing the underlying causes of terrorism is the third element of the 3–D Strategy of Abolishment. Through an aggressive, protracted campaign, the United States and the international community will directly or indirectly engage vulnerable states of concern, geographic regions, and disparate peoples to mitigate the underlying conditions that encourage the development of terrorist ideologies, terrorist groups, sympathizers, and recruits. In addition, the United States will lead a concerted and comprehensive effort that fosters an international environment that clearly communicates that acts of terrorism are unacceptable and morally reprehensible.

Goal: Diminish the underlying conditions that permit terrorism to flourish.

Objectives: To diminish the underlying causes of terrorism over the long term, the United States, in concert with the international community, should:

- determine the contributing factors that give rise to terrorism
- mitigate or eliminate those factors
- delegitimize terrorism as a method for change and encourage a positive perception of the United States and its policy goals.

End State: The long-term goal to eliminate every underlying cause and condition that contributes to the rise of terrorism is overly ambitious. However, marginalizing the conditions that breed terrorism through the collective efforts of the United States and the international community will contribute greatly in the war against terrorism. Focused long-term efforts to promote economic development, educational enlightenment, and the development of good governance, which encourages tolerance, openness, and individual liberties, will establish a firm foundation on which to build. The ultimate objective is the development of states that are capable of providing the basic necessities for their own people and ultimately demonstrating to their populace that free and democratic societies are a far better alternative than those being presented by terrorist organizations.

A Multinational Approach

The United States is committed to assisting in the effort to diminish the underlying conditions that foster terrorism and assisting those states that want to help themselves. However, the United States cannot undertake this difficult challenge alone and will not condone any expenditure of resources or effort on unwilling states or states that condone or support terrorism.

As stated in chapter 3, it is essential for the United States to enlist the international community in this campaign. Diminishing these conditions requires a multinational burdensharing approach that will take time and require extensive diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts. Enlisting the efforts and resources of nongovernmental and private organizations will also help share the burden in the campaign to diminish the underlying conditions.

To be successful, the United States and its allies should strategically allocate resources to develop those countries where terrorism has already taken root and those where terrorism is likely to take root. Identification of states, regions, and populations that possess conditions ripe for terrorist exploitation is critical in developing a strategic framework for assistance programs. Determining high-risk areas and states that require immediate attention, and lower-risk environments, will allow the effective application of resources and prioritization of assistance programs and activities. These priorities will assist the international community in the development of near-, intermediate-, and long-term assistance programs and goals for each identified area or nation.

While committed to assisting regions and states to diminish conditions that enable terrorism to breed, resources and assistance should never be provided by the international community pro bono. Conditions such as political, economic, and educational reform should be attached to assistance. Regions and states receiving assistance will have to demonstrate their commitment to reform and eliminate conditions that contribute to terrorism. To the extent it proves useful in abolishing terrorism overall, aid could be made conditional on states ending support for terrorism, including political support. No aid or assistance should be provided to states that support or condone terrorism. Any state that fails to meet expectations, or is exposed for sponsoring or harboring terrorists, would be categorized as a state sponsor of terrorism and become a potential U.S. target for defeat.

Diminishing the underlying conditions of terrorism will undoubtedly be the most difficult and complex part of the 3-D strategy. The collective efforts of the United States and the international community will take time before the world will see discernable results and a measurable decrease of terrorism. However, if society is to achieve the strategic aim of abolishing terrorism as a method for political change, then mitigating the underlying conditions that allow terrorism to flourish is paramount.

Determine the Contributing Factors that Give Rise to Terrorism

The first step in diminishing the causes of terrorism is to identify the conditions and factors that play a dominant role in regions where terrorism exists. The most prominent contributing factors that enable terrorism to flourish are:

- economic and social inequities in certain societies are marked by both abject poverty and conspicuous affluence
- poor governance, along with economic stagnation or decline, that alienates many segments of a nation's population
- illiteracy and lack of education that leads to widespread ignorance about the modern world and resentment toward encroaching Western values
- U.S. foreign policies, particularly regarding the Middle East, that have caused widespread resentment toward the United States.

Conditions that breed despair and a deep dissatisfaction with the status quo can lead to violence and terrorism. Such an environment enables individuals, organizations, and even governments to lash out, blaming outside powers such as the United States for failures of the society. People or groups in troubled societies can gain support by calling for the destruction of the existing order. For example, in some Muslim countries, there are individuals and organizations dealing with the pressures of rapid modernization that call for the overthrow of the existing world order in favor of an imagined utopian past that never existed. The level of desperation is so overwhelming that terrorism or even suicide appears to be a better alternative than living in the present world.

As the perceived leader and major beneficiary of the existing world order, the United States has become a target of attack for those people and groups who believe that America obstructs their efforts to change a social or international order. Since the United States will never stand down as the leader of the current world order, it will endeavor to diminish factors that can be manipulated to garner support for terrorism.

Economic and Social Inequity: Poverty and economic disparity or deprivation exist as a result of poor economic positioning in the world economy, poor economic policies, and poor governance. Poverty and lack of sustained economic growth alienate some people from the status quo to the extent that terrorism appears the only available tool to achieve change. In a March 2002 speech, World Bank president James Wolfensohn noted, “We will not create a safer world with bombs or brigades alone.”⁵⁵ While poverty alone does not lead to violence, it “can provide a breeding ground for the ideas and actions of those who promote conflict and terror.”⁵⁶

Stagnant economies have created both unemployment and underemployment for significant sections of the labor forces in many countries, leaving many young adults feeling hopeless about future opportunities. In addition, economic growth has not kept pace with population growth and demographic trends. Large percentages of the population in developing countries are under the age of 15, which suggests a very high demand for government services, water and sanitation, housing, and education. Poor healthcare, disabling infectious disease, and poor health infrastructure contribute to lost productivity, further exacerbating the problem and contributing to an environment in which terrorism can flourish.

Poor Governance: Poor governance and corruption also create conditions where terrorism can grow. Many developing countries face daunting challenges because successive regimes focus more on maintaining or consolidating their own power than developing a stable, prosperous society. Poor governance leads to social disenfranchisement, oppression, and repression, and often results in conflict. Some political systems do not allow citizens to participate in political processes and express their grievances. Instead, political structures serve to insulate regimes and governing elites from the populace desiring change. The voice of the people is ignored until disaffection of the population turns to rebellion. Lack of democratic institutions, particularly judicial systems and rule of law, leave governments unable to establish or maintain law and order. This lack of law and order within societies fuels internal strife as well as regional conflict.

In societies where governance is poor, government-controlled media often promote biased reporting, misinformation campaigns, and self-serving propaganda to divert public attention from internal grievances to alleged external threats. In certain regions, particularly those with strong tribal traditions, group identity (values, culture, language, religion) is perceived as being threatened by outside, encroaching cultures. The lack of existing channels and mutually accepted rules of conduct between government entities and civil society leads to discontent, unresolved grievances, and alienation of the population.

Illiteracy and Poor Educational Systems: Illiteracy and poor educational systems in many regions of the developing world contribute to the underlying causes of terrorism. Suspicion of outside influences may grow where there is widespread ignorance about the world, history, geography, politics, and other cultures, including the United States and its values, principles, and interests. This ignorance often leads to a fear of globalization—and of Western culture in particular—within many societies. This is particularly true in the Middle East and other regions where countries are struggling to define their political, economic, social, and even religious identities in an ever-changing world. State-sponsored educational systems are inadequate to meet a growing demand, so private, narrowly focused religious-based schools have filled the gap. The lack of educational systems and an overabundance of schools teaching extremist ideologies have fostered intellectual climates that are hostile to experimentation and discovery.⁵⁷

Perceived Unfair U.S. Foreign Policies: Finally, strong resentment of official U.S. foreign policies has led to misplaced blame and hatred against the United States by many Islamic nations in the world. This contrasts with the colonial era in the Middle East, when people enduring European colonial rule viewed the United States as the beacon of democracy. Today, largely due to U.S. actions and policies regarding the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, a large proportion of Arabs perceive U.S. policy as unfair and a double standard. Criticizing human rights violations by Arab countries, while treading lightly on those committed by Israel, incites resentment and hatred toward the United States.

Specifically, many segments of Islamic society resent the strong support that the United States has provided Israel. These people believe that by supporting Israel, the United States has marginalized Islam and looked the other way as Israel oppressed and displaced the Palestinian population. While support for Israel is important, the United States should clearly understand the unintended consequences of its actions and policies in the Middle East, and the effects of those actions and policies on its efforts to diminish the causes of terrorism. To avoid more friction and animosity within the region, the United States should thoroughly reexamine its policies to prevent further resentment and to denigrate the ideology of terrorism.

Mitigate or Eliminate the Factors that Give Rise to Terrorism

To mitigate or eliminate the factors that give rise to terrorism, the United States and the international community should strategically allocate resources to develop those regions and states identified as high-risk and to develop those where terrorism has gained significant numbers of citizens sympathetic to the goals of using violence to fend off the modern world order. The international community should develop a new strategic framework that sets priorities and guides the allocation of international foreign aid.

International efforts need to focus on promoting economic development, educational enlightenment, and political systems that encourage tolerance and openness in willing states. One step toward this goal was taken at the March 2002 aid summit in Monterrey, Mexico, where several nations agreed to increase foreign aid to countries that make political and economic reforms.⁵⁸ By helping struggling societies find a way to prosperity for the bulk of their people in the modern, globalized world, civilized nations can demonstrate that modernized, open societies provide a better alternative than those being presented by terrorist organizations.

As part of that effort, the United States should renew efforts to remind people of what America stands for. As the world leader, it is in U.S. interests to help create a world in which different cultures can live together in security and dignity; in which economic opportunity is expanded for all;

in which individuals can go to work, educate their children, and worship peacefully; and in which young people can find meaningful roles and meaningful jobs.

To mitigate or eliminate the factors that contribute to terrorism, the United States should focus international efforts to:

- create a favorable environment for sustained economic growth
- promote accountable and participatory governance
- promote literacy and education in the Islamic world and underdeveloped nations
- engage in information operations to denigrate the concept of terrorism and discredit supporting ideology
- reenergize efforts for peace and stability in the Middle East.

Create a Favorable Environment for Sustained Economic Growth: The United States and the international community should help those countries willing to undertake the necessary reforms to create broad-based economic growth in high-risk areas. This will bring poor, disadvantaged, and marginalized groups into the mainstream economy. The United States and the international community need to foster an environment of “helping those who are willing to help themselves.”⁵⁹

Economic growth in developing countries leads to reduced poverty, increased food security, and higher standards of living, including better health. Broad-based economic growth offers the best chance to enhance political stability and transform societies, enabling them to prosper in the globalized international order. Individuals whose basic human needs are met, who are increasingly prosperous, who feel empowered, and who believe they have a stake in the future are less likely to accept terrorism as necessary to redress the status quo.

The United States should use every means of economic and diplomatic power and influence to develop new and expanded foreign assistance programs for high-risk states. Aggressive and sustainable international development programs will require increased funding. Government funds should be set aside for the long term to design and implement these sustainable programs. Other creative financing options may be available (for example, corporate tax relief for pro bono development work). Money and assets linked to terrorist organizations that are seized, rather than frozen, could finance development programs.

Diplomacy will be needed to strengthen commercial partnerships, private markets, and trade and investment opportunities for weak states that are committed to fighting terrorism. The United States should encourage international financial institutions to develop concessionary loans and restructure international debt for willing states.

The United States Agency for International Development, which oversees U.S. foreign assistance programs, should thoroughly review its regional economic and social development strategies, policies, and priorities in support of activities that help to eliminate underlying conditions that contribute to terrorism. Grant assistance in the areas of economic growth, agricultural development, and small business development will help create economic growth and increased employment opportunities. New foreign assistance initiatives should be focused on the burgeoning number of youths in many developing countries, creating meaningful employment opportunities to provide youth with a constructive sense of purpose and community.

Development strategies also should be created to assist governments to deliver public services to their growing populations. These public services include, but are not limited to, infrastructure; roads to deliver goods to the marketplace; hospitals, clinics, and basic public health services; water purification; and electrification.

Economic development programs should address macroeconomic problems and trade and investment policies that constrain broad-based growth. The United States should help nations

eliminate cumbersome or preferential regulations and improve financial market efficiency. Management practices and programs should encourage export-led development by focusing regional economic cooperation and trade to increase mutual economic interests. In addition to reducing poverty, opportunities exist to expand U.S. exports, support U.S. national security interests, and redress trade balance ratios.

The United States should support institutional links between U.S. and regional business associations that nurture and strengthen local capacity to analyze and advocate policies, thereby reducing trade barriers and increasing domestic competition. Regional and American businesses can also introduce improved technologies in health and the environment.

Nongovernmental organizations should ensure that local communities participate in designing development programs that are appropriate and acceptable. Collaborative aid programs that employ local expertise increase the probability that assistance is distributed in the most effective manner possible. Communities help ensure that economic inequities are decreased. Local participation will also provide control over perceived negative Western influences, such as consumerism. The more sustainable the collaborative projects are, the more significant the leverage the United States has.

Communities and countries that strengthen economic growth will diminish the economic deprivation and discontent that can give rise to terrorism. Increased employment opportunities provide income and a sense of hope to young adults. Providing hope results in fewer terrorist prospects being recruited. Increased economic prosperity reduces poverty and economic disparity, giving more people a stake in the modern world order.

Promote Accountable and Participatory Governance: Political stability and economic growth are interdependent. Instability thwarts investor confidence and economic growth. Lack of economic prosperity and opportunity contributes to political instability. Therefore, political reform is a critical requirement to ensure stability while creating the environment for economic growth. Better governance encourages widespread citizen participation and enables institutions to respond to citizen needs and rising expectations. If citizens fully participate in a country's economic, political, and social development *and* governments are capable of conducting just negotiations and enforcing the rule of law, then political grievances and disputes may be solved peacefully and nonviolently.

The United States and the international community should use traditional bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and foreign assistance programs to improve national and local political governance activities of willing states. Diplomacy and foreign assistance should devote time and energy to prevent and reduce internal conflicts. Diplomatic visits by senior U.S. and international officials would validate international support for improved governance and would assist in garnering financial support for these international democracy programs.

Promoting democracy and good governance requires the collective efforts of the United States and the international community, including private and nongovernmental organizations. Strengthening democratic institutions, civil society participation, and government accountability, while improving the rule of law and improving military professionalism, can reduce the alienation of people from their governments, thus mitigating one of the factors that fosters terrorism.

Democratic institutions in states threatened by terrorism should be strengthened. Many countries where terrorism flourishes have weak or nascent democratic institutions. While the United States has provided foreign assistance to strengthen governance and democracy in many countries, additional priority should be placed on South Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and Indonesia—countries that are largely Islamic. According to a Freedom House Survey, countries in the Middle East are mainly considered “partly free” or “not free.”⁶⁰ The United States and its allies need to demonstrate that the principles of democracy and good governance are compatible with Islam. In

addition, the United States should make key countries in Latin America, such as Colombia and Mexico, a higher priority to prevent terrorism from gaining a larger foothold near its borders.

Governance programs should establish and strengthen civil society organizations to create mechanisms for citizens to participate more fully in government. In many regions and countries, civil society organizations (for example, nongovernmental organizations, civic organizations, think tanks, polling companies, universities, and the press) are either nonexistent or extremely weak. Civil organizations can play an important role in holding governments accountable for corruption, human rights violations, and maintaining law and order. In addition, governments and civil society organizations should establish locally appropriate mechanisms for expressing grievances, solving issues, and affecting change. Political education programs for civilian leaders should be developed.

Rule of law is an essential component of political development and should be strengthened to eliminate terrorism. *Rule of law* refers to the basic principles of equal treatment of all people before the law and constitutional guarantees of basic human rights. Citizens living in regions where terrorism flourishes often lack the means to hold their government accountable for human rights violations or for maintaining the rule of law. Development strategies will be effective only if there is a system of law enforcement based on written civil law that is relatively free from corruption. In addition, rule of law is critical to resolve internal conflict. To improve the rule of law in high-risk states, programs should develop, reform, and strengthen legislative, judicial, and law enforcement processes.

Strengthening government transparency and accountability can also reduce the alienation of people from their governments. As the world becomes more interdependent economically and technologically, more demands will be placed on national and local governments to provide good governance and to deliver basic health, education, and welfare services to their growing populations. Improving governmental transparency will help to reduce corruption in political, social, military, and law enforcement institutions. Foreign assistance to local governments for planning, budgeting, financial management, and public administration will help to improve government ability to provide basic services and to meet the growing expectations of their populations.

Finally, the United States should support increased military-to-military assistance to improve civil-military relations and to strengthen the capabilities of foreign military institutions. Civilian and military leaders in high-risk states should receive additional training to improve professionalism and cooperation. Congress should thoroughly review restrictions on the International Military and Education and Training programs. U.S. military assistance and training is often the only effective mechanism to bring about civil-military reforms and to help military institutions abide by international standards of military behavior. Yet U.S. assistance is denied to governments considered having bad human rights records or abusive militaries. While the United States should promote human rights, it cannot hope to effect change if it is not significantly involved.

The United States should be mindful of the limits of its influence in the political arena and the sensitivity of encouraging democratic change. Democracy is not the panacea for all countries. In countries facing severe internal divisions, for example, democracy can be destabilizing. Every society, however, can find ways to improve public participation and respect for basic freedoms consistent with its strategic culture and traditions. Improving political participation, deepening respect for the rule of law, and protecting the rights and sanctity of the individual will contribute greatly to diminishing the underlying causes of terrorism.

Promote Literacy and Education in the Islamic World and Underdeveloped Nations: High illiteracy rates coupled with living conditions of unimaginable poverty produce a fertile breeding ground for desperate, angry people—an environment ripe for recruiting terrorists. Conditions discovered in Afghanistan clearly illustrate the point. Afghani males have a life expectancy of approximately 46

years.⁶¹ The average life expectancy of Afghani women is slightly more than 44 years. Only half of Afghani men are literate, and, officially, only 22 percent of Afghani women can read.⁶² There is approximately 1 television for every 270 people, and radio penetration fares only slightly better. These kinds of statistical indicators point to a society in which personal oral communication is the primary message-bearing technique.

The education system throughout the Muslim world, in particular, is a major source of rage toward the United States and the West. The problems are poor curricula and inflammatory textbooks that teach intolerance, the impossibility of compromise, and anti-Western rhetoric and attitudes. New education programs should be designed to instruct youths on the evils of terrorism and the futility of engaging in it.

The United States should not seek to Westernize other societies but instead should lay the foundations for better-educated societies that are more immune to anti-Western messages. These societies can then better discriminate between fact and fiction. Members of a more literate and better-educated society would be better able to prosper in the modern world. Higher literacy and education rates would yield higher levels of employment. It is well established that educating girls and women is one of the best development investments a country can make. Educated women raise healthier children, have lower fertility, tend to keep their children in school longer, and exercise their political and legal rights more effectively.

Inadequate information technology and infrastructure in many high-risk states inhibit educational advancement and economic development. It is not coincidental that societies with high computer usage rates or access to the Internet tend to realize much greater economic benefits. Afghanistan, with a population of about 27 million, has about 2,000 Internet users. There are more people in the Pentagon with ready access to electronic communication than there are in the entire country of Afghanistan.

The United States and the international community should increase their investment in literacy, formal education, and information technology to diminish the underlying causes of terrorism. The primary means to achieve improved literacy and education are foreign assistance programs directed to increasing public and private education; public-private sector partnerships for education initiatives; comprehensive public diplomacy campaigns; and foreign exchange programs and media outreach strategies.

Initiation of a “hands-on, hands-off” strategy to public schooling is one method to build better-educated societies. A hands-on strategy would encourage national governments to increase budgetary support for public education programs. The United States and international financial institutions should assist governments to build schools, train teachers, and provide opportunities for people of all ages to continue their educational development. This would entail establishing not only a public school system for both male and female students but also adult education centers and libraries where people may read and research subjects of their own choosing without the fear of authoritarian retaliation.

A hands-off strategy more specifically applies to mandated curricula. The United States should offer assistance and support for curriculum development and encourage governments to revise curricula in religious schools to eliminate anti-Western rhetoric and attitudes. However, the United States and nongovernmental organizations should not dictate the kinds of subjects taught or the contents of courses since this could lead to further resentment.

The United States and its international partners should help strengthen education systems, including universities in Arab and South Asian countries, to prepare their citizens for the modern world. U.S. corporations interested in doing major business in these countries could offer career

development programs to nations that need to train and motivate their youth. The United States would have an audience due to the respect accorded to the quality of its higher education system and awareness of its offering career-linked education.

Partnered with the private commercial sector, the United States should invest in improving infrastructure (facilities), establishing Internet communications, and providing computer equipment and training in schools and libraries in selected developing countries. Such efforts would help educate students about the modern world, history, politics, science, and other cultures.

As a result of these interventions, the quality of education will be improved in targeted states of the developing world. Improving education levels in the world will create conditions for peace, stability, and prosperity. Youth in the developing world will become more open-minded, tolerant, and knowledgeable about the world. All of these factors together will help reduce ignorance and build societies that oppose terrorism.

A major challenge that policymakers should anticipate and understand is the sensitivity within the Islamic world toward initiatives intended to increase literacy, education, and fact-based cultural awareness programs in their society. Programs of this nature would require creative approaches to mitigate any perceived challenges to the authority, legitimacy, and power of Islamic clerics. For example, enlisting Muslim clerics from America and the international community to assist in these type programs will enhance legitimacy and help reduce friction. As literacy and education levels rise, the power of verbal persuasion commonly found in the Islamic world will begin to decrease. Muslims would then be able to identify for themselves the positive benefits of coexisting cultures. This, however, could lead to efforts by the radical Islamic clerics to incite spontaneous demonstrations with potentially violent overtones, not unlike that which was witnessed in Tehran in 1979. For this reason, understanding the sensitivities and developing creative methods to initiate programs of this nature is crucial.

Engage in Information Operations to Denigrate the Concept of Terrorism and Discredit Supporting Ideology: To diminish one of the underlying causes of terrorism and discredit this ideology of hate, the United States should first understand it and then mitigate the threat and resentment that people believe the United States possesses. The United States should work through Islamic leaders to mitigate actions and policies that fuel anti-American sentiment and cause people to hate the United States. Then the United States should work with the international community to delegitimize terrorism as a morally acceptable option to achieve political, material, or religious gain.

Understanding the problems of modernity versus tradition may provide insights that will enable the United States to denigrate the concept of terrorism and discredit supporting ideologies. Over the last 40 years, societies in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia have experienced a rapid transformation not unlike what the West went through over a period of 200 years. Undergoing societal changes of this magnitude, including geographic mobility, urbanization, and media exposure, has resulted in people who are overwhelmed by the rapid change and ill equipped for what the modern world brings, thus creating the perception that Westernization threatens them culturally, economically, and politically. People in these regions, especially the population under 25 years of age, know little about the United States, and what they do know often comes via a gatekeeper. In the case of the Middle East, this is usually via the Minister of Information or a religious or community leader since the press is censored. Political leaders have tried to compensate for their shortcomings and weak legitimacy by deflecting blame to real or imagined internal and external enemies.⁶³ For example, the Egyptian press says little about the extensive economic aid the United States provides to Egypt but a great deal about U.S. financial and military support for Israel, which is regularly demonized in the Egyptian press. A concerted and sustained effort of effective international diplomacy, increased

foreign assistance, and public diplomacy will be required to denigrate the concept of terrorism, discredit its supporting ideology, and change popular perceptions about the United States.

Secondly, the United States along with the international community needs to delegitimize and discredit terrorism as a morally acceptable option. The abolishment of terrorism should be an international goal that permeates throughout allied and coalition efforts. Large international meetings, such as the Yalta Conference during World War II, would be a good way to gain cooperation for the abolishment of terrorism, especially in the Middle East and broader Muslim world. Using mass media directed at audiences in vulnerable states to publicize international successes against terrorism and international support for the fight against terrorist will also delegitimize terrorism.

Public diplomacy should be expanded and foreign assistance provided to educational institutions for programs that persuade people (particularly youth) that terrorist violence is evil and provide an alternate vision of more moderate Islamic teachings that advocate peaceful coexistence with the West. This should be done in close collaboration with Islamic experts. Working with religious leaders to demonstrate that terrorism is evil under all religions, and to further discredit the ideology of hatred and violence that is embodied in terrorism, is crucial. In the case of the Muslim world, including countries with Islamic minorities, the United States should exert particular influence on Islamic leaders to demonstrate that terrorism is evil and inconsistent with the tenets of Islam. To that end the United States should enlist its own Muslim clerics to speak out and condemn terrorism unanimously and highlight the fact that terrorism is inconsistent with the tenets of Islam. A strategy to diminish the underlying causes of terrorism should include a component that promotes the dignity and cultural heritage of Islam and the ability of Muslims to coexist peacefully with the West. Such a strategy would serve to diffuse anger directed toward the United States and would help bolster mutual understanding and acceptance of Western and other cultures.

Third, the United States should work with leaders of other countries to find ways to mitigate the threat and resentment that people believe the United States poses. This will require implementation of an extensive public diplomacy campaign to counter misperceptions and disinformation. The public diplomacy campaign should publicize the extent to which the seven million Muslims living in the United States practice their religion, educate their children, and uphold their moral values freely. American Muslims need to participate actively and lead this effort so that it is a credible and accurate portrayal. The success of American Muslims living a full and morally proper Muslim life in a secular, materialist society demonstrates how Islam can coexist with Western culture. The campaign should also focus on educating people about U.S. principles and values, noting that despite the separation of church and state, religion and religious values exert considerable influence over American public life and morals. The campaign should demonstrate that diversity of opinion in the United States is not only tolerated but also enshrined in government and that differences can be resolved peacefully.

Fourth, the United States needs an aggressive public diplomacy and information campaign to counter new sources of information, such as satellite television stations, that compete by being inflammatory and anti-American. Such efforts should include pressing governments to show a balanced view of the United States and providing interviews with U.S. Government officials on a range of television stations.

Finally, to discredit terrorist organizations directly, the United States should launch an extensive public diplomacy campaign, graphically showing that terrorist organizations have misused the sacred charitable donations required of all Muslims to fund the mass murder of innocent people. The *fatwa* issued by Osama bin Laden, and other attempts to use Islam to incite terrorist violence, should be exposed by Muslim scholars as falsely interpreting Islam by showing specifically where and how

these statements violate sacred Islamic texts. The United States should work with foreign governments and Islamic officials to publicize the results of such clerical studies. Since Islam does not have a central authority that interprets scripture, there are a wide variety of Islamic teachings. The United States should join with governments in Islamic countries to promote those schools, scholars, and clerics who teach peaceful coexistence with the West and to shut down those who call for violence.

These efforts will result in greater understanding and support for the majority view of Islam as a religion that can peacefully coexist with the West. Islamic clerics and scholars who advocate violence against the West, and schools that promote such ideas, will be condemned and closed, replaced by ones that teach the true lessons of the Koran. Eventually, over time, perceptions of the United States and the West will improve, rejection of terrorism as a means to effect change will begin to ebb, and news and media outlets will broadcast issues and events in a more truthful and balanced manner.

This aspect of the strategy to diminish the underlying conditions is difficult, potentially resource intensive, and will require the continuous effort over time by the United States and international partners before achieving measurable success. However, any effort to reverse a perception and alter a culture is sensitive work that requires patience and determination. In the end the results will be positive and will strengthen the international movement against the use of terrorism.

Reenergize Efforts for Peace and Stability in the Middle East: The Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to fuel resentment and anti-American sentiment in the Middle East. Consequently, terrorist organizations see great value in exacerbating the situation to strengthen hatred toward the West, create a united Arab and Muslim mindset hostile to Israel's supporters, and discredit and blame the United States. Although a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has proven elusive, a continued U.S. effort toward peaceful solution is needed to help diminish the underlying causes of terrorism.

There are three principal reasons the Israeli-Palestinian conflict undermines efforts to diminish the causes of terrorism in the region. First, the situation provides a wellspring of propaganda. Many people in the Arab world opposed the establishment of Israel and today oppose Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights. Terrorists can easily distort events into a pro-Palestinian—therefore pro-Arab and pro-Muslim—message. Second, many in the region view terrorism as a legitimate means for Palestinians to achieve their political goals. They see utility in engaging in acts of terrorism. Third, several of the 33 Foreign Terrorist Organizations identified by the Department of State claim that their goal is to establish a Palestinian state. By claiming to represent the Palestinian cause, these groups gain legitimacy, sympathy, and financial support from individual contributors, charities, and nation-states—funds that are then funneled to terrorist organizations or terrorist families. These three reasons are further defined below and highlight the need to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian issue before significant progress can be made to abolish terrorism in the Middle East.

With deep-rooted anti-Israeli sentiment so pervasive in the region, virtually any action Israel takes to defend itself is viewed as aggression. Israel's efforts to combat terrorism have resulted in a near endless series of incidents shaped by the Middle Eastern press as brutal and extreme. The extensive media coverage of recent Israeli-Palestinian clashes is far more graphic than images broadcast into American homes and has a strong anti-Israeli bias. The hardships Palestinians suffer under Israeli occupation get extensive press coverage in the Middle East, while Israeli security concerns are not mentioned. Terrorist organizations understand the galvanizing effect of perceived Palestinian suffering from the Israeli "oppressor" and continue to levy attacks to instigate Israeli responses, which then fuel further propaganda.

Terrorists also turn Israeli actions into propaganda against the United States. The U.S. support for Israel's legitimate right to self-defense is distorted to be U.S. support for anything Israel does to

the Palestinians. U.S. public criticism of Israel gets minimal press coverage in Arab countries. The continued barrage of unbalanced information has eroded U.S. prestige and influence over time, relabeling America as the Great Satan rather than being the Shining City on the Hill inspiring democracy. The net result is a delegitimized U.S. foreign policy, which weakens the effort to abolish terrorism. Most people in the Arab world do not accept the terrorist claim that U.S. support for Israel makes America a legitimate target of attack. However, they oppose any support their governments would provide to U.S. policy in the Middle East. Terrorists can use widespread resentment of U.S. policy to mobilize opposition against any government that undertakes measures to support American efforts to abolish terrorism. Several Arab nations are particularly vulnerable because they should undertake highly controversial measures to root out terrorism within their borders or may be asked to provide basing and related support for U.S. attacks on fellow Muslim nations that support terrorism. By linking such actions by Arab governments to an illegitimate and anti-Arab, anti-Muslim U.S. foreign policy, terrorists can stir fervent public opposition.

While U.S. foreign policy and its ability to inspire democracy have eroded in the Middle East, terrorist organizations have grown in legitimacy. Many nations in the region have not only failed to condemn acts of terrorism but have in fact supported terrorists and their families. Terrorists are too often viewed as freedom fighters, not as murderers of innocent individuals. Due to a broad and unbridled hatred toward Israel, terrorism is easily rationalized as the only weapon the Palestinians have against a far more powerful Israel. Consequently, terrorism is being justified in many circles as an acceptable means to achieve Palestinian independence. Even in the international arena, considerable debate has ensued regarding the need to negotiate with organizations associated with terrorism despite a long-standing U.S. policy never to give in to terrorist demands. Terrorists have frequently undermined attempts to negotiate a resolution to the current Israeli-Palestinian fighting by initiating terrorist attacks at the very moment negotiations seemed to be making progress. By provoking the other side to react with countermeasures, terrorists continue the cycle of violence. Peace in the Middle East will remain elusive as long as terrorism maintains its grip on the situation. To delegitimize terrorism, it needs to be painted as the reason for delays in reaching an acceptable solution between Israelis and Palestinians. The message that needs to be echoed in the region and around the world is that terrorism *causes* problems, not *resolves* them.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict also justifies the existence of several terrorist organizations. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Palestinian Hizballah, Umar al-Mukhtar Forces, and the Martyrs of al-Aqsa are five terrorist organizations that routinely attack Israel in support of the Palestinian cause. Each is on the Department of State's list of 33 Foreign Terrorist Organizations. For several of these terrorist organizations, and others like Al Qaeda and Iran who provide direct and indirect support, attacking Israeli and Western targets in support of the Palestinians serves larger goals, such as removing Western influence from the region or deflecting attention from domestic problems. The Palestinian plight strikes a chord with many throughout the world, which is leveraged to garner support and funding. Even with charities established in the United States to support the Palestinian cause, some of the donations go to terrorist organizations. Moderate Muslim governments such as Saudi Arabia are providing funds to families of suicide bombers, which appears to many in the United States as tacit approval of terrorism. Terrorist organizations gain both funds and recruits by claiming that they support a noble and just Palestinian cause.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a clear example that the underlying causes of terrorism need to be addressed and serves as a microcosm of the global terrorist problem. Terrorism exists because people and organizations see it as an acceptable means to resolve their grievances. Given the results of decades of failed efforts, it is unclear when and how the current conflict can be solved. More

realistically, what is needed is an ongoing peace process, to present an alternative means to resolve the conflict, or at least to make progress in peacefully addressing Palestinian and Israeli grievances. To diminish the effect of this conflict on the underlying causes of terrorism, the United States should be seen as pushing all sides to negotiation and compromise. An ongoing peace process would undermine terrorist efforts to use the conflict to gain legitimacy and support.

To counter anti-American propaganda, the United States should ensure that its position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is more effectively presented in the Middle East. While the United States strongly supports Israel's need for security, it has called on Israel to halt the expansion of settlements in the occupied territories, minimize civilian casualties from security operations, mitigate measures that impose hardship on the Palestinian people, and take other steps to address Palestinian grievances regarding the Israeli occupation. When Israel takes measures that are against U.S. policy or interests, the United States should be quick to say so publicly to refute the common perception that the United States supports such actions. Such public criticism of Israel would not undermine the strong support that the United States provides Israel but would enable the United States to return to its desired role as a credible, honest broker. A more balanced U.S. public diplomacy would make U.S. efforts to combat terrorism more effective by enabling Arab governments to provide the support needed to abolish terrorism.

Terrorism also exists because organizations see it as a viable means. Maintaining a firm stand against terrorism, and seeking ways to maneuver around those who use terrorism to undermine peace efforts, is critical. This highlights the need for well-integrated information operations to manage perceptions regarding the use of terrorism and to counter disinformation created to justify it. The true battle going on in the Middle East is for the hearts and minds of the larger Muslim population. The United States is already at a disadvantage and is losing ground at an alarming rate. Information is key, but so are deeds. A multidisciplinary approach that integrates message with action, to include America reexamining its policies in the region, needs to be pursued.

In that regard the United States should use all its diplomatic, informational, and economic capabilities to establish itself as an honest broker with a balanced approach to solving the crises in the Middle East, reexamining and, if necessary, refocusing policies in the region. The mission is to demonstrate that the United States is not a threat to Muslims, but a friend truly interested in establishing a peaceful coexistence with the Muslim world. The alternative is continued conflict and violence, with the promise of an ever-increasing trajectory of violence menacing not only the region but also the world.

Summary for Diminishing the Underlying Causes of Terrorism

The political, economic, and social conditions that have fostered terrorism around the world have become worse during the last decade, especially with the advent of information technology and globalization. Targeted, comprehensive, and sustained diplomatic and foreign aid assistance programs are urgently needed over the next decade to improve economic growth, political governance, health, and education in developing countries. Such measures will bring value to people's lives, which will help to reduce conflict. Renewed energy and leadership should be devoted to restoring peace in the Middle East. The United States has the strength and conviction to create a world in which peace, prosperity, and freedom are guaranteed rights of every individual. Terrorism threatens that world, but sustained commitment to improving individual rights and opportunities will eventually succeed in abolishing it.

While Always Defending America

*Our nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack. We will take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans. These measures are essential. But the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows.*⁶⁴

—George W. Bush
September 20, 2001

Integrating Defense with Combating Terrorism

While not identified as one of the 3–Ds in the offensive effort to combat terrorism, defending America is an essential aspect of the overall strategy. In a globalized world, the boundaries defining America’s homeland and the international arena have blurred. U.S. citizens and interests are located throughout the world. Financial systems, international markets, computer and media networks, and transportation systems extend far beyond America’s frontiers. America’s fight against terrorism therefore should include a forward defense. True security for the American homeland will come about only by destroying terrorism where it grows. Meanwhile, the United States must defend its homeland from terrorism. Offensive actions and defensive efforts should work together to abolish terrorism as a means to achieve societal change.

Goal: Integrate defensive measures to provide security for America and support the overall strategic aim of abolishing terrorism.

Objectives: The United States should be postured to provide an effective defense and to provide key capabilities to support the offensive effort in three areas:

Prevent terrorism. To the maximum extent possible, would-be terrorists must be denied entry into the United States, as well as the weapons they intend to use. Weapons of mass destruction in particular must be detected and intercepted before they can be employed. Collaboration at all levels of government, along with the private sector and individual citizens, is essential to disrupting terrorist aims.

Protect critical assets. To deter terrorism and minimize the probability of a successful terrorist strike on the Nation’s key facilities, the United States must protect critical infrastructure and other potential terrorist targets.


Prepare responses. To reduce the impact of terrorism, the United States must be prepared to respond to and mitigate the consequences of an attack, including conducting follow-on investigations to uncover terrorist operations and holding those responsible accountable. This is particularly critical when responding to attacks from weapons of mass destruction. All agencies at the Federal, state, and local level must work together to improve America’s responses.

End State: A safe and secure American homeland, protected citizens and interests abroad, and defense measures fully synchronized with America's strategy to combat terrorism.

These objectives outline what the United States needs to do to protect the homeland and defend its citizens. Although this chapter will present each objective at the macro level, the key message is how they relate to the 3-D Strategy of Abolishment. A strategy to defend America is at least as complex as combating terrorism. It deserves a strategy all its own, but that is beyond the focus of this paper. The discussion here centers on the strategic seams between defending America and combating terrorism. Overlaps between the strategies are essential because gaps may have disastrous consequences. Offensive and defensive efforts working together, and sometimes overlapping, is the best way to ensure that the United States remains safe and secure at home, preserves its way of life, maintains economic growth and stamina, and remains engaged in the international effort against terrorism. Without an effective defense, the United States will be driven to focus on matters at home, diverting attention away from the offensive effort to combat terrorism overseas. As figure 6 suggests, there should be a balanced approach between the offensive and defensive efforts, both of which significantly contribute to the overall effort to abolish terrorism.

There are a number of synergies that exist between the two strategies. Those synergies need to be exploited. Defending the homeland by preventing terrorists from entering the United States, protecting critical assets, and preparing responses for future attacks each support the three primary objectives of abolishing terrorism. For example, the effort to prevent terrorism in the United States may identify terrorist operatives and connect them to overseas operations, providing information needed to conduct a military strike. Strong protection measures may strengthen deterrence by convincing potential terrorists that their operations will likely be intercepted. Being well prepared for terrorist attacks strengthens consequence management capabilities, which in turn reduces the effects

Figure 6: **Offense-Defense Relationship**



of terrorism and helps delegitimize terrorism as an effective means to cause societal change. These synergies are further presented in figure 7.

Prevent Terrorism

Defending America requires measures and procedures to prevent acts of terrorism from occurring. Such preventative measures require extensive capabilities to detect and disrupt terrorists before they can execute their plans, principally by identifying them and keeping them from entering U.S. territory or property. Improvements in four overarching areas can help bring this about. First, the United States needs to integrate defense efforts with counterterrorism efforts conducted overseas. Second, the manner in which people and materials transit U.S. borders needs to be better organized to prevent terrorists and their weapons from entering America. Third, information should be shared on a national and international basis to ensure suspected terrorists are not allowed to move about freely. Fourth, a national education process needs to be implemented to leverage the eyes and ears of the approximately 285 million Americans in the war against terrorism.

Overseas Effort: To provide true security to America, terrorism must be defeated where it grows. The United States, along with the international community, needs to work vigorously to achieve that end. In the meantime, forward-defense measures are critical to prevent terrorism in the United States. The concerted effort to prevent terrorists and their weapons from entering the United States begins overseas. Points of entry to America's airports and seaports are not stateside but are in effect located in other countries. Thousands of aircraft and ships depart foreign locations daily bound for the United States. It would be far more effective to screen manifests, luggage, cargo, and containers *before* they depart foreign soil. While the international community has worked hard over the years to ensure air travelers and their belongings are monitored for foul play, more can be done on

Figure 7: Overlapping Strategies

Combating Terrorism				
Defending America		Defeat	Deter	Diminish
	Prevent	Intercepting potential terrorists at U.S. borders may reveal terrorist activities and operations.	Capturing terrorists at U.S. borders serves to deter future attempts.	International aid and assistance relies on a robust economy—preventing terrorism protects U.S. markets.
	Protect	Robust defenses complicate terrorist plans—may increase terrorist cell visibility as a result.	Failure to achieve desired results due to protection measures helps deter future attempts.	Well protected asset reduces chances of terrorist success—failures delegitimize terrorism over time.
	Prepare	Investigations following acts of terrorism may illuminate cells, groups, or sponsors.	Holding groups and sponsors accountable for acts of terrorism ensures costs exceed perceived benefits.	Mitigating impact of "successful" terrorist acts helps delegitimize terrorism over time.

that front, particularly with the use of advanced technologies to identify terrorists and the weapons they use. Implementing these technologies at overseas locations may prove more valuable than employing them in the United States, increasing the probability that terrorists and their weapons are detected before arrival.

A more challenging concern, however, is screening bulk cargo and shipping containers entering America's seaports. The Coast Guard does not have the resources to screen every vessel approaching U.S. territory. A more prudent approach would stress inspections at foreign ports, rather than those conducted during in-transit boardings or at U.S. ports of entry. Doing more inspections overseas lowers the risk to the United States while strengthening the deterrence value of being able to intercept materials before they can harm Americans.

Bolstering Borders: Not only should America push security measures overseas but those at home should also be strengthened. The number of illegal aliens and the amount of illegal drugs transiting U.S. borders underscore how relatively easy it is to bring people and materials into the country undetected. Terrorists with weapons of mass destruction pose the greatest threat to American security. They must be kept out. This will be a key challenge to the Office of Homeland Security as it reviews options to improve security at the Nation's borders. Undoubtedly, Mexico and Canada will prove pivotal in developing measures to stem the flow of undocumented and undetected people and materials through their countries into America. As part of the overall effort to combat terrorism, these countries, particularly Mexico, may need aid and assistance to improve their counterterrorism efforts.

Tracking Terrorists: One of the most important initiatives to combat terrorism as well as defend against it is to improve significantly the capability to identify and track terrorists and then to share that information with those who need it to defend the United States. Considerable discussion has already been presented regarding the need for enhanced intelligence to identify terrorists, potential terrorists, and their groups. Equally important is the need to track their movements once they have been identified. Improved data exchanges are needed between intelligence and law enforcement agencies at the national and international level and to those granting visas and processing passports. This may require the establishment of a new agency that has the authority to tap into all source intelligence and law enforcement databases to paint a complete picture of potential terrorist activities.

Also, better information needs to be coupled with better tracking tools. Although an unpopular choice among many, biometrics seems a prudent choice to strengthen the validity of identification processes, particularly in an era of advanced computer-based printing capabilities. Counterfeit documents are simply too easy to create or valid documents too easy to alter for illicit purposes. To minimize the impact of altered or counterfeit documents, the technology exists to use thumbprints, retina scans, or other such mechanisms to verify individual identification. This technology should be exploited. Without positive means of identification, innocent people will continue to be subjected to unwarranted scrutiny, while people of most concern may pass unnoticed. Intelligence, positive identification, and shared information systems on a national and international level present the greatest opportunity for improved defense.

Educating Americans: Without creating undue alarm, Americans should be educated on antiterrorism measures. Educating Americans on terrorist tactics and methodologies can significantly increase the Nation's ability to monitor and therefore prevent potential acts of terrorism. Arming citizens with a greater understanding of what constitutes a terrorist threat may have the added benefit of reducing the number of false reports, allowing the government to focus on events of real concern. Citizens taking personal responsibility for their own safety and those around them can prove most valuable in the war against terrorism. The government cannot duplicate the value of 285 million

individuals on the lookout in virtually every corner of America for suspected terrorists and the methods they use. An enhanced state of awareness is equally important overseas. Tourists, businessmen, government workers, and their families all need to understand the threat and to be postured to minimize their vulnerability. Whether at home or abroad, Americans need a greater understanding of the terrorist threat. A multifaceted education process, ranging from public service information to the Nation's formal education curricula, needs to highlight how individuals can make a difference in the war against terrorism. Those educational processes that seem to work best can be shared with other countries to help foster a heightened state of awareness across the globe. Rewards for information coupled with anonymous reporting procedures may prove useful as well, in both America and internationally, to prevent acts of terrorism. Overall, an educated citizenry enhances situational awareness, reduces unnecessary risks, and helps foster national and international resolve and commitment in the war against terrorism.

Protect Critical Assets

Recognizing that there are no infallible measures to prevent terrorists from entering an open society like the United States, efforts must be taken to protect critical assets from potential attack. Furthermore, measures should be implemented to protect American facilities overseas. As the United States strengthens defenses in its homeland, terrorist organizations will likely seek alternative ways to attack Americans, possibly at U.S. properties and facilities located in other countries. To marginalize potential terrorist attacks, America should first identify potential vulnerabilities, then develop technologies and capabilities to minimize those vulnerabilities, and finally implement prudent measures at home and abroad to protect critical assets. Providing robust protection against terrorism may convince potential terrorists their efforts will likely fail or, if attempted, cause them to be captured and their organizations to be targeted for destruction. This serves to strengthen the deterrence message, thereby contributing to the overall effort to combat terrorism. Over time, it may also help delegitimize terrorism as more and more terrorist efforts result in failure. On a more practical level, defending key assets contributes directly to the offensive effort by ensuring that war-supporting facilities, command nodes, communications systems, and information networks remain available. Again, the ties between offensive and defense measures are many.

Identifying Vulnerabilities: The United States does not have unlimited resources to protect every conceivable threat to U.S. critical infrastructures and facilities. Not only must vulnerabilities be identified, but they also must be characterized and categorized in a manner that allows prioritization. Two competing considerations bear on any prioritization, which serves to complicate vulnerability assessments. There are those vulnerabilities that face the *most likely* threat, and those that face the *most serious* threat (that is, the most potentially damaging or lethal). Assessing and prioritizing vulnerabilities should strike a balance between these two considerations. This requires extensive expertise among a variety of fields, not the least of which are cyber security, power generation systems, water supplies, food distribution, healthcare systems, continuity of government, transportation systems, and financial institutions. Each area should be red teamed by a panel or commission of experts to determine the most lucrative terrorist targets and then prioritized in a manner that reflects likelihood and threat severity. Tapping into information garnered from the effort to combat terrorism may prove insightful. Captured terrorists and their plans may reveal areas they consider vulnerable, allowing greater fidelity in red team assessments. This highlights the need for a continued and unfettered dialogue between those combating terrorism and those defending against it. Organizational structures and communications systems should support this exchange.

Developing Technologies: U.S. vulnerabilities to acts of terrorism may be significantly reduced through exploitation of emerging technologies. As a priority, capabilities should be developed that can detect weapons of mass destruction and associated components. If terrorists are able to acquire nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, those weapons will most likely be imported into the United States. Multilayered detection systems at U.S. borders and key locations throughout the Nation may reduce the likelihood that terrorists can move their weapons to intended locations. For lesser threats, surveillance technologies may provide cost-effective means to detect movement of high explosives and other materials that terrorists use. To prevent access to critical facilities, electronic badging and security access systems can significantly impede terrorist entry. Furthermore, integrated computer data systems may be used to reveal suspicious purchases or acquisitions intended to create terrorist bombs. These are merely examples. American ingenuity can no doubt develop a myriad of cost-effective means and measures to protect critical assets and thwart terrorist aims at home and abroad. They should be developed and shared with friends and allies to the maximum extent possible and vice versa. As required, the U.S. Government should support and fund these technologies to speed development and employment. Advanced technologies provide the greatest promise to counter the asymmetric nature of terrorism, and they should be exploited as soon as possible.

Implementing Protective Measures: A thorough review of potential vulnerabilities and exploitation of emerging technologies should be followed up with effective protective measures. This is a task far greater than can possibly be done at the national level. State and local governments, as well as the private sector, should work together to reduce American vulnerabilities to terrorism. The Nation has already developed and implemented a terrorist alerting system. This system will allow tailored approaches based on current threat assessments. At each level of government, along with corporate America and private citizens, protective measures need to be predefined and ready for implementation as the threat assessment changes. For example, if the Office of Homeland Security raises the terrorist threat assessment to Red, which is the highest, checklists and procedures should already be in place for government, private sector, and individual citizen response. Americans at work and at home need to know what to do to minimize their exposure to acts of terrorism without resorting to extreme or counterproductive measures, such as hoarding, vigilantism, or hysteria. Prudent and integrated measures across all aspects of society, tailored for each threat level, can provide substantial protection against acts of terrorism.

Prepare Responses

Despite America's best efforts to keep terrorists off U.S. soil and protect its citizens, terrorists will likely find a way to carry out an attack, potentially on a large scale. A key aspect of defending America is preparing for that possibility. The international community is just now beginning to understand the interconnected nature of the terrorist threat and the links between organizations, state sponsors, and supporters. These links allow terrorist access to a wide array of capabilities, which may include nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Even without weapons of mass destruction, terrorists may create mass effects by using conventional capabilities in an asymmetric manner as was seen on September 11, 2001.

Consequence Management: To prepare for the unexpected, the United States should enhance its domestic consequence management capabilities to mitigate the effects of terrorism, particularly if weapons of mass destruction are used. In the hours and days following the September 11, 2001, attack, the U.S. Government, from the national to local level, displayed impeccable skill in managing the immediate consequences of the attack. First responders such as fire departments, police forces, emergency medical teams, and hospital staffs all performed admirably. The Federal Aviation

Administration swiftly assessed the situation and directed complete closure of U.S. airspace. Military aircraft were on patrol over New York and Washington, DC, within minutes of the attack. Much of America rallied in response by donating blood and making charitable contributions. There are, however, opportunities for improvement. Following the attack, buildings and downtown areas were emptied all across the Nation causing gridlock and disruption. In the Pentagon, there were no accounting provisions to determine who was injured or missing of the 27,000 occupants. The initial death tolls in the World Trade Center indicated 7,000 to 8,000 casualties, when reality was less than 3,000. When the consequences of an attack are blown out of proportion, the second and third order effects are exacerbated, which is exactly what terrorists hope to do. The U.S. Government should carefully assess and characterize each attack rather than allowing media speculation to fill the gap. Ripple effects in the economy, stock market, and the manner in which Americans carry out their daily lives need to be mitigated to the maximum extent possible. Marginalizing the overall effects of an attack and maintaining a degree of resiliency to the psychological impact terrorists hope to generate help delegitimize terrorism.

Proper organization at all levels of government will be exceptionally important as roles and responsibilities for homeland defense are determined. The Federal Government has already established the Office of Homeland Security, and DOD has announced plans to create a unified command dedicated to homeland defense. State and local governments should ensure that they are organized to interact with the national effort. While exercising sound fiscal responsibility to ensure homeland defense funds are properly expended, the Federal Government needs to determine which areas of the country are most vulnerable to terrorist attack and to prioritize which local governments most need Federal support. Overall, Federal efforts should focus on ensuring that local efforts are effectively linked to Federal measures for homeland security.

On the whole, existing consequence management capabilities are well suited to respond to low-to medium-scale terrorist attacks on America's homeland, as was the case on September 11. The greater concern, however, is large-scale attacks that involve nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Such attacks pose a serious threat to national security, and the United States needs to be well postured to respond. Evidence is clear that terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda have been eagerly seeking weapons of mass destruction. As a result, America needs to redouble its efforts in developing responses to a potential nuclear, biological, or chemical event, including ensuring that local fire departments, emergency medical services, and police forces in the most vulnerable areas are trained and equipped to respond.

Assuring Attribution: While first responders and other governmental agencies and organizations are managing the consequences of a terrorist attack, considerable effort should simultaneously be directed at investigating and determining who is responsible. This requires the utmost integration between the offensive and defensive aspects of the war on terrorism. Following a terrorist attack, law enforcement, criminal justice, and intelligence agencies need to work in close concert to evaluate evidence and share information to uncover as much information as possible regarding those responsible. Executing a terrorist attack in the United States may leave a heavy footprint in terms of support and sponsorship, potentially yielding a wealth of information on terrorist operations. Barriers to reasonable and prudent investigative measures need to be evaluated and removed if they significantly hamstring the government ability to expose linkages and support networks to terrorist organizations.

Some of these barriers have been removed, but not without considerable public debate on the impact to American civil liberties. This discourse is invaluable. Rescinding or encroaching on the Nation's freedoms should not be taken lightly. The debate on civil liberties includes how to treat terrorists when bringing them to justice. Are they criminals or combatants? The answer seems clearer

when their motives and aims are revealed. The terrorists who conducted the September 11, 2001, attacks are members of a larger organization that is essentially carrying out an insurgency on a global scale—in other words, as discussed in chapter 2, a pansurgency. As such, they are in essence war criminals because the war they are conducting is an illegitimate one, following neither the international norms for *jus ad bellum* (a just reason for war) and *jus in bello* (just conduct in war). Terrorist organizations lack the legitimate authority for declaring war, and their methodology of intentionally threatening, harming, or killing innocent persons does not comply with just conduct requirements in wartime. As such, terrorists should not be afforded rights and privileges accorded combatants under the Geneva Convention. Military tribunals are an appropriate means to levy justice given the illegitimate status of those engaging in or supporting acts of terrorism.

In addition to providing information that supports defeating existing terrorists, holding terrorist groups and their supporters accountable strengthens the deterrence message. Other terrorist organizations must see that costs clearly exceed the benefits of engaging in acts of terrorism, particularly when done on American soil. Not only must terrorists overcome the Nation's prevention and protection measures, they must guard against robust U.S. activity to hold them accountable for their actions. When terrorists see there is no utility in engaging in acts of terrorism or it results in their own arrest or the destruction of their organization, civilized society will be well on the way to abolishing terrorism as a means to effect change.

Simulations and Exercises: One of the best ways to determine the capabilities needed to respond to terrorist attacks is to conduct simulations and exercises. Broad, large-scale simulations and exercises allow an in-depth assessment of the Nation's preparedness to defend against terrorism. Not only should simulations and exercises be developed that allow Federal, state, and local agencies to work together, but they also should be developed to allow international interaction. Those agencies combating terrorism overseas should interact with agencies defending America's homeland. Mexico and Canada should be encouraged to participate in exercises that have potential consequences for North America. Conducting isolated exercises within single agencies or geographical boundaries fails to capture the magnitude of potential terrorist attacks. The United States has already conducted a number of exercises in preparation for potential acts of terrorism, but it needs to institutionalize simulations and exercises across all elements of society (for example, schools, corporations, and hospitals) and across all sectors of government.

Recognizing that high fidelity, large-scale exercises require significant resources and, as a result, will be conducted relatively infrequently, smaller-scale exercises and simulations can significantly improve preparedness when conducted in a complementary role. This is particularly true for the private sector and general population. As a minimum, citizens, corporate America, and nongovernmental organizations should be encouraged to practice increased levels of terrorist alert, perhaps through public service announcements and as an ongoing human resource management training function. Plans should be prepared ahead of time for private groups, citizens, and nongovernmental organizations to respond to the Office of Homeland Security's terrorist alerting system. Those plans should be practiced on a regular basis just as military organizations have practiced changes in their terrorist threat notification system over the past 15 years. Practicing terrorist response plans on a regular basis will contribute to overall awareness of the terrorist threat, which in turn should help maintain public resolve to fight terrorism and strengthen defense measures across much of American society.

Summary of Defending America

Neither the offensive effort to combat terrorism nor the defensive effort to secure the homeland can be conducted in isolation. There are many synergies between the two efforts that can be established by integrating components of the strategies. Detecting and capturing terrorists attempting to enter America can provide information essential to the effort on defeating existing terrorist groups. Follow-on investigations can provide key information and intelligence to further the fight against terrorist groups. Developing capabilities and technologies that bolster protection of key facilities strengthens deterrence. Being well prepared for an attack can marginalize terrorist efforts by making the expected damage from an attack less likely. Assuring attribution can also help delegitimize terrorism by making certain those responsible, as well as their organizations and sponsors, pay costs exceeding the perceived benefits. From a grand strategy perspective, diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power should be well integrated with the domestic antiterrorism programs overseen by governing agencies at the Federal, state, and local levels. Whether at home or abroad, in offense or defense, the United States must maintain a single-minded determination to abolish terrorism.

Conclusion

*The world is a dangerous place to live, not because of the people who are evil, but because of the people who don't do anything about it.*⁶⁵

—Albert Einstein

America is in a unique position as the world's sole superpower. During his acceptance speech for the Republican Party's nomination for the Presidency, George W. Bush stated, "all this prosperity, and to what great purpose?"⁶⁶ The tragic events of September 11, 2001, reminded America that defending freedom is its "great purpose." To this end, global terrorism must be defeated. Civilized nations must rise to this challenge, perhaps the most daunting ever faced.

The pansurgency of interconnected terrorist organizations must be defeated and terrorism must be abolished. The United States should convince the international community, to include all nations and all organizations, that the practice of terrorism is not a viable means to achieve political, ideological, or material gain. Never again can the society of freedom-loving nations allow a global evil to reach the magnitude achieved on September 11, 2001.

The 3-D Strategy of Abolishment will require unprecedented synchronization of all instruments of power by the United States and its allies if they are to achieve the ultimate end state of abolishing terrorism. Orchestrating and synchronizing the various capabilities for combating terrorism—from freezing financial assets to destroying terrorist camps—will require the utmost global leadership skills. These activities should be coordinated with an international coalition of partners aligned in the global campaign against terrorism. Competing aims and objectives of the various nations will at times challenge the foundation of the coalition and will thus require constant U.S. interaction and diplomacy to sustain the effort and successfully prosecute the war on terrorism.

Throughout, there must be no doubt among those who harbor ill will against the United States. America will not stand idly by as civilization itself is threatened. Rather, the United States will do whatever is required, as part of an international coalition or alone, to defeat terrorism and protect America and its citizens.

The United States and its allies should be committed to a campaign to combat terrorism that will demand a multidimensional and orchestrated global approach. The 3-D multidimensional strategy establishes these goals—*defeating* terrorist groups, *detering* future acts of terrorism, *diminishing* the underlying causes, while always defending America from future terrorist attacks—to achieve its strategic aim of abolishing terrorism as a means to accomplish change within a society, a government, or world order.

Abolishment of terrorism is a long-term initiative likely to take years and possibly decades to achieve ultimate victory. America possesses not only the vision and the strength to see this effort to

fruition but also the moral imperative to lead a global partnership of nations. Innocent civilians must not live in terror of being held hostage or harmed to further the goals of radical organizations. America has proven time and time again its resolve to defend liberty. As Robert F. Kennedy stated, “the enlargement of liberty for individual human beings must be the supreme goal and the abiding practice of any Western society.”⁶⁷ An international strategy of such magnitude demands the leadership of the only nation capable of doing so—the United States of America.

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